Browsing by Author "Bennedsen, Morten"
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Junge, Martin; Meisner Nielsen, Kasper; Torp Jespersen, Svend; Kragh Jacobsen, Jesper; Bennedsen, Morten (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Firms in the European countries today have the possibility of choosing from a range of control enhancing mechanisms giving the controlling owners an amount of influence which is disproportional to their share of cash flow. The list of control enhancing mechanisms includes dual class shares, pyramidal ownership structures and several others. The justification for these control enhancing mechanisms is currently the subject of much debate within the European Union. The opposing positions in the debate can be stated briefly as i) the control enhancing mechanisms are an impediment to takeovers and should therefore be removed to improve the market for corporate control. ii) Removing the control enhancing mechanisms reduces the contractual freedom to decide desirable ownership structures. This report investigates whether ownership structures affect firm performance. To do so this study provides a description of the current ownership structures in European countries and the economic outcomes for firms using different ownership structures. The results are presented in the tables below. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7491 Files in this item: 1
rep03-2007.pdf (359.3Kb) -
Bennedsen, Morten (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
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Separating the Impact of Dual Class Shares, Pyramids and Cross-ownership on Firm Value Across Legal Regimes in Western EuropeBennedsen, Morten; Meisner Nielsen, Kasper (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Recent policy initiatives within the harmonization of European company laws have promoted a so-called "principle of proportionality" through proposals that regulate mechanisms opposing a proportional distribution of ownership and control. We scrutinize the foundation for these initiatives by analyzing the use of instruments to separate ownership from control across legal regimes in a sample of over 4,000 publicly traded firms from 14 Western European countries. First, we confirm the negative impact on firm value from disproportional ownership structures previously established in a sample of Asian firms by Claessens et al. (2002). Second, we show that dual class shares have a larger and more significant negative effect on firm value than pyramids and cross holdings. Third, we find that the impact of disproportionality and the underlying instruments is inversely related to the level of investor protection. Thus, dual class shares and pyramids substitute legal protection in countries with inadequate investor protection. Fourth, we find no evidence of a significant effect of disproportionality instruments on earnings performance. Finally, we discuss policy implications of these findings in relationship to the process of harmonization of the European capital markets. JEL classifications: G30, G32, G34 and G38 Keywords: Ownership Structure, Dual Class Shares, Pyramids, EU company laws. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7544 Files in this item: 1
wp22-2005.pdf (414.4Kb) -
Hvad ved vi og hvad kan det bruges til?Bennedsen, Morten (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: I provide a short survey on recent research on the governance of closely held corporations. I focus on the strategic choice of ownership structure, the creation of family firms and the role of the board in the closely held corporation. Attention is payed to policyimplications of the research results. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7524 Files in this item: 1
wpec022004.pdf (179.2Kb) -
effekter af at harmonisere selskabslovgivningen i EUBennedsen, Morten; Nielsen, Kasper (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Bennedsen, Morten (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Now showing items 21-26 of 26