Browsing by Title
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Andersen, Kim Normann (Frederiksberg, 2011)[More information][Less information]
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Game piracy activity vs. metacritic scoreDrachen, Anders; Bauer, Kevin; Veitch, Robert W. D. (Frederiksberg, 2011)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The practice of illegally copying and distributing digital games is at the heart of one of the most heated and divisive debates in the international games environment, with stakeholders typically viewing it as a very positive (pirates) or very negative (the industry, policy makers). Despite the substantial interest in game piracy, there is very little objective information available about its magnitude or its distribution across game titles and game genres. This paper presents a large-scale analysis of the illegal distribution of digital game titles, which was conducted by monitoring the BitTorrent peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing protocol. The sample includes 173 games and a collection period of three months from late 2010 to early 2011. A total of 12.6 million unique peers were identified, making this the largest examination of game piracy via P2P networks to date. The ten most pirated titles encompass 5.27 million aggregated unique peers alone. In addition to genre, review scores were found to be positively correlated with the logarithm of the number of unique peers per game (p<0.05). URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8501 Files in this item: 1
drachen_bauer_veitch_2011_2.pdf (165.5Kb) -
Astrup Jensen, Bjarne (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
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The Pedagogy of the CBS MPA Programme RevisitedRy Nielsen, J.C. (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
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Skaates, Maria Anne (København, 1997)[More information][Less information]
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'Being Infringed' as a Normatively Induced Innovation Exploitation StrategyReitzig, Markus; Henkel, Joachim; Heath, Christopher (, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Patent trolls (or sharks) are small patent holding individuals or firms who trap R&D intense manufacturers in patent infringement situations in order to receive damage awards for the illegitimate use of their technology. While of great concern to management, their existence and impact for both corporate decision makers and policy makers remains to be fully analyzed from an academic standpoint. In this paper we show why patent sharks can operate profitably, why they are of growing concern, how manufacturers can forearm themselves against them, and which issues policy makers need to address. To do so, we map international indemnification rules with strategic rationales of small patent-holding firms within a game-theoretical model. Our central finding is that the courts’ unrealistic consideration of the trade-offs faced by inadvertent infringers is a central condition for sharks to operate profitably. Keywords: Patent, patent shark, patent troll, damage award, infringement JEL Classifications: M00, M11, M21, K00, K11, K33 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7249 Files in this item: 1
ssrn-id885914.pdf (277.4Kb) -
Rose, Caspar; Lando, Henrik (København, 2000)[More information][Less information]
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[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper presents a critique of Freek Vermeulen’s synthesis of rigor and relevance in management research, and argues (1) at the first glance, Vermeulen’s papers are very appealing; (2) but with a closer scrutiny, we can unveil the weak and shaky foundations of his argument; (3) as a consequence, his solution of ‘adding a second loop’ to make management research meet dual needs of rigor and relevance is illusory and merely an applied science fiction; (4) and finally, there are two real contributions of his papers to the irrelevance debate, but they are not like what we might have thought. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7827 Files in this item: 1
wp2-2009-xl.pdf (223.8Kb) -
A model of trade with several countries where local integration benefits allHansen, Bodil O.; Keiding, Hans (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: For the study of economic integration, it is costumary to use a three countryworld, where two of the countries may introduce forms of closer economic cooperation. In the present model, we follow this tradition but put special emphasis on the role of credit and entrepreneurship. Our model is of the standard neoclassical type, with the addition that production takes time and is subject to uncertainty. Also, firms must use the financial system in order to buy inputs; the cost of credit may differ among countries and industries, reflecting their basic patterns of uncertainty. Following the Newbery-Stiglitz approach, we show that in such model we may exhibit cases of Pareto inferior trade and, in particular, Pareto inferior economic integration. More specifically, we show that integrating countries of very different economic size may give rise to adverse effects on welfare, whereas integration of countries with a more similar economic structure and size tends to have beneficial effects for the parties. Keywords: trade, uncertainty, Pareto inferior trade, regional integration. JEL classification: F11, F15, F34 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7495 Files in this item: 1
wp4-2005.pdf (124.2Kb) -
Rethinking organisational culture inspired by the "becoming" perspectiveDarmer, Per; Bøgetoft Christensen, Jens (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
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Lando, Henrik (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This article compares a set of often used simple contracts or mechanisms in terms of how well they allocate decision rights between two agents over time. A basic assumption is that agents incur a fixed cost each time they renegotiate. The contracts or mechanisms studied are: individual ownership and authority, the first-come first-serve rule, the alternating rule and the sign-up rule. One trade-off that arises is the following: when usage of the asset is flexible in the sense that it does not matter in which period it occurs, agents may rely on obtaining the asset through arriving first at some point, while when an agent needs to time and plan the use of the asset, he or she may wish to hold stronger rights or to use the sign-up rule as a simple form of contracting. (JEL:D10, D23, L22); Keywords: Incomplete contracts, individual ownership,first-come first-serve rule, costly renegotiation. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6815 Files in this item: 1
wplefic012004.pdf (658.9Kb) -
Gudum, Connie K. (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Drewsen, Merete; Lando, Henrik; Cummins, Tim (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This is not a theoretical paper but an application of existing law and economic contract theory to the issue of how to draft a specific kind of contract. It is addressed to practitioners and is intended for practical use. It will be part of a Wiki (as in Wikipedia) for contract drafting, which IACCM (International Association for Contract and Commercial Management) has initiated. The main theoretical aspect of the article concerns the application of the value maximization principle (the Coase theorem) to the drafting of confidentiality agreements. While the article is not theoretical, its prescriptions are open to theoretical dispute; this may especially be the case for the section on the size of damages. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7250 Files in this item: 1
ssrn-id917927.pdf (114.9Kb) -
Product Experimentation in the Music IndustryLorenzen, Mark; Frederiksen, Lars (Frederiksberg, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The paper is conceptual, combining project and economic organization literatures in order to explain the organization and management of market-based projects. It dedicates particular focus to projects set up in order to facilitate product innovation through experimentation. It investigates the internal vs. market economies of scale and scope related to projects, as well as the issues of governance, planning and coordination related to reaping such economies. Incorporating transaction cost perspectives as well as considerations of labour markets, the paper explains the management of market-organized innovation projects by virtue of localized project ecologies and local labour markets of leaders and boundary spanners. It illustrates its arguments with a case study of the Recorded Music industry. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7881 Files in this item: 1
DRUID_05_23.pdf (174.4Kb) -
a stylished model for Egypt with some numerical policy examplesRisager, Ole; Yang, Chang-Po (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper analyzes the consequences of pursuing a less activist Government employment stabilization policy strategy in Egypt. On the basis of a fairly stylized model we find that a reduction of the Government’s involvement in the economy along with an introduction of mild but binding firing regulations in the private sector may lead to a rise in total employment and to an improvement in Egypt’s trade balance vis-à-vis the rest of the world. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7659 Files in this item: 1
1999_3.pdf (84.99Kb) -
Lando, Henrik; Rose, Caspar (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Abstract: Proponents of specific performance as a remedy for breach of contract have found support in the alleged use of the remedy in Civil Law countries. However, we provide evidence that specific performance is in fact a rare remedy in Denmark, Germany and France, and under CISG, when performance requires actions to be undertaken, and we relate this to costs of enforcement. We argue that it is administratively costly to run a system of enforcement that renders specific performance attractive to the aggrieved party, and that the Civil Law countries have (like Common Law countries) chosen not to incur these costs of enforcement. This is especially clear in the case of Denmark, where specific performance of actions has been abandoned as a legal remedy. At the normative level, we argue that enforcement costs provides an additional rationale, over and above the rationales of the theory of efficient breach, for damages and against specific performance as the general remedy. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6823 Files in this item: 1
wplefic142003new2.pdf (270.4Kb) -
Lorenzen, Mark (København, 2008)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The paper presents stylized facts about the economic organisation of the film industry, arguing that while we know a lot about production, specialization and internationalization, the complex processes of globalization are still under-researched. The paper concludes with a research agenda of how to address globalization. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8146 Files in this item: 1
x656557108.pdf (202.1Kb) -
Lorenzen, Mark (, 2008)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The paper presents stylized facts about the economic organisation of the film industry, arguing that while we know a lot about production, specialization and internationalization, the complex processes of globalization are still under-researched. The paper concludes with a research agenda of how to address globalization. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7775 Files in this item: 1
Creative Encounters Working Papers 8.pdf (202.1Kb) -
Eliasson, Gunnar; Wihlborg, Clas (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The New Economy is closely associated with computing & communications technology, notably the Internet. We discuss property rights to, and trade in, the difficult-to-define intangible assets increasingly dominating the New Economy, and the possibility of under-investment in these assets. For a realistic analysis we introduce a Schumpeterian market environment (the experimentally organized economy). Weak property rights prevail when the rights to access, use, and trade in intangible assets cannot be fully exercised. The trade-off between the benefits of open access on the Internet, and the incentive effects of strengthened property rights, depend both on the particular strategy a firm employs to secure property rights, and the protection offered by law. Economic property rights can be strengthened if the originator can find innovative ways to charge for the intangible assets. The extreme complexity of the New Economy and the large number of possible innovative private contract arrangements make it more important to facilitate the use and enforcement of private individualized contracts to protect intellectual property than to rely only on standard mandatory patent and copyright law. Enabling law is one proposed solution. Current patent legislation in the US has led to costly litigation processes weakening the position of small firms and individuals in patent disputes. The property rights of such firms and individuals could be strengthened with insurance or arbitration procedures. Key words: Competence bloc theory, Enabling law, Experimentally Organized Economy, New Economy, Weak property rights, Tradability, Underinvestment. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6811 Files in this item: 1
wplefic052003.pdf (378.8Kb) -
Lando, Henrik (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]