Browsing by Author "Davis, Lee"
Now showing items 1-7 of 7
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Who Cooperates with Firms, and Why?Lotz, Peter; Davis, Lee (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Academic scientists are under increasing pressure to engage in more commercially "relevant" research, through either patenting and licensing research results, or research cooperations. This paper seeks to add to our understanding of academic-business collaborations (contract research, joint research, and consulting) by presenting preliminary results from a novel survey of academic researchers in the life sciences in Denmark. We seek to draw a "profile" of those researchers who cooperate, and why. Expressed in a different way, we would like to determine what researcher characteristics and competencies business, in practice, demands. Both university and hospital scientists were polled. Our most surprising finding is that there is a consistent and highly significant relationship between strong publication records and cooperation, across both researcher groups, and for all forms of cooperation. Our results underline that it is important that scientists be permitted – indeed, encouraged – to continue to operate within the norms of the academic community, where success is measured by the collegiate reputation-based reward system, thereby maintaining a clear division of labor between what scientists do best, and what business does best. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6777 Files in this item: 1
wp06-2006.pdf (97.16Kb) -
Davis, Lee (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Davis, Lee (Frederiksberg, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper investigates in an exploratory manner the licensing strategies pursued by firms whose business model is based on developing and licensing out their intellectual property rights (IPRs). These are not traditional suppliers, since they do not engage in production or commercialization, but focus solely on invention. While considerable anecdotal evidence exists about these IP vendors, there has been no systematic investigation of how they use licensing to appropriate value from their investments in R&D. In this paper, we suggest that the licensing strategies they pursue can be differentiated along two main dimensions: whether the driving force behind the inventive process is “technology push” or “market pull”, and the degree to which the innovative activities carried out by the IP vendor are mutually dependent upon the innovative activities of the other relevant market players. On this basis, four main licensing strategies are identified. We investigate the relative benefits and costs of these four strategies, and the factors affecting licensing choices. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7878 Files in this item: 1
DRUID_06_12.pdf (182.4Kb) -
Davis, Lee (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper investigates in an exploratory manner the licensing strategies pursued by firms whose business model is based on developing and licensing out their intellectual property rights (IPRs). These are not traditional suppliers, since they do not engage in production or commercialization, but focus solely on invention. While considerable anecdotal evidence exists about these IP vendors, there has been no systematic investigation of how they use licensing to appropriate value from their investments in R&D. In this paper, we suggest that the licensing strategies they pursue can be differentiated along two main dimensions: whether the driving force behind the inventive process is "technology push" or "market pull", and the degree to which the innovative activities carried out by the IP vendor are mutually dependent upon the innovative activities of the other relevant market players. On this basis, four main licensing strategies are identified. We investigate the relative benefits and costs of these four strategies, and the factors affecting licensing choices. Key words: Intellectual property, licensing, strategy JEL Codes: O31, O32, O34 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7266 Files in this item: 1
wp06-12.pdf (182.4Kb) -
Davis, Lee (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Do Patents "Crowd Out” Prizes?Davis, Jerome; Davis, Lee (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Debate over the merits of patents versus inducement prizes has tended to ignore the signaling roles of patents, and totally ignores the impact of patent signaling on prize contests. This paper asks: How does patent signaling affect the strategic choices of firms considering entering prize contests? First, we consider contests that do not allow patenting, then contests that do. If patenting is not allowed, we argue, patent-holders, both internal and external to the contest, can adversely impact prize contests by claiming prize winner violation of their patents, and suing for damages. The likelihood of such challenges being made can deter entry, particularly in contests requiring large sunk costs. Furthermore, the firm's decisionmaking process will discriminate against entering prize contests and favor R&D projects with patentable outcomes. Together, these problems may circumscribe any future wider role for prize contests, and limit their major putative welfare advantage: the ability to place prize winning solutions into the public domain. In contests where entrants may patent their inventions, entry is subject to basically the same problems as above (although such contests may carry some advantages as regards contest design). Our overall conclusion is that prize contests are liable to fail due to the lack of potential entrants, particularly as regards entry on the part of larger commercial firms. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7204 Files in this item: 1
ipr-w_12-davisdavis-mai03-1.pdf (332.8Kb) -
Davis, Lee (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
Now showing items 1-7 of 7