Browsing by Author "Heath, Christopher"
Now showing items 1-2 of 2
-
'Being Infringed' as a Normatively Induced Innovation Exploitation StrategyReitzig, Markus; Henkel, Joachim; Heath, Christopher (, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Patent trolls (or sharks) are small patent holding individuals or firms who trap R&D intense manufacturers in patent infringement situations in order to receive damage awards for the illegitimate use of their technology. While of great concern to management, their existence and impact for both corporate decision makers and policy makers remains to be fully analyzed from an academic standpoint. In this paper we show why patent sharks can operate profitably, why they are of growing concern, how manufacturers can forearm themselves against them, and which issues policy makers need to address. To do so, we map international indemnification rules with strategic rationales of small patent-holding firms within a game-theoretical model. Our central finding is that the courts’ unrealistic consideration of the trade-offs faced by inadvertent infringers is a central condition for sharks to operate profitably. Keywords: Patent, patent shark, patent troll, damage award, infringement JEL Classifications: M00, M11, M21, K00, K11, K33 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7249 Files in this item: 1
ssrn-id885914.pdf (277.4Kb) -
A Comparative International Analysis of Innovation Incentives from Patent Indemnification RulesReitzig, Markus; Henkel, Joachim; Heath, Christopher (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Abstract: This paper contributes to the fundamental discussion of setting optimal liabilities in restitution law by analyzing the effects that the existing multitude of indemnification rules for patent infringements have on innovative and imitative activity. From a theoretical legal standpoint, the choice of patent law is particularly enlightening due to its hybrid public and private nature. From an economic perspective its relevance lies in regulating the driving forces of welfare in highly industrialized societies. Our analysis of regulations from six different jurisdictions (US, JP, DE, UK, FR, NL) reveals that from a scholarly standpoint none of the regulations sets optimal liabilities in general. Our major finding is that an expectation damage rule based on a renegotiation outcome from an ex-ante perspective (falling in between the generic legal notions of ‘lost profits’ and ‘infringer’s profits’) between licensor and licensee appears optimal in patent infringement cases to avoid dynamic inefficiencies. The result is intuitive, however, was not predicted by the existing literature on indemnification law. Keywords: Patents, litigation, damage awards, innovation, infringement JEL-Classifications: K41,L00, L20 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6827 Files in this item: 1
wplefic182002new.pdf (499.7Kb)
Now showing items 1-2 of 2