Browsing by Author "Nielsen, Kasper"
Now showing items 1-8 of 8
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Bennedsen, Morten; Nielsen, Kasper (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Bennedsen, Morten; Nielsen, Kasper (København, 2001)[More information][Less information]
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Evidence from CEO TransitionsBennedsen, Morten; Nielsen, Kasper (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Economists have long acknowledged that the structure of the family (number of offspring, marital status, etc.) plays a crucial role in important economic decisions (e.g., labor supply, demand patterns, portfolio choice, educational attainment). In this paper we investigate the link between family structure and corporate decisions of family firms. Even though there is considerable anecdotal evidence on this link, there is no systematic study. This paper fills this gap. To this end, we assembled a unique dataset with accounting information from 1995 to 2002 of the universe of privately held firms in Denmark. Our dataset includes the family trees of the owners as well as personal information about all family members. This information allows us to identify family firms among privately held firms. We find that, using a 50% definition of control, 89% of privately held firms are family firms. We focus on the decision whether to choose a family member or an outsider as the next CEO. We show that the larger the pool of potential heirs, the higher the probability of family transition. Also we document that this probability is significantly lower when all offspring are female. Finally, family conflicts (proxied by divorce or multiple marriages) reduce the probability of family transition. In a robustness check we show that there is a causal effect from family structure to corporate decisions. We do this by instrumentimg the number of children with sibling sex composition and by restricting the sample to one in which founders had their last child years before founding the firm. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7631 Files in this item: 1
wpec032004.pdf (354.0Kb) -
Bennedsen, Morten; Nielsen, Kasper (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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The Role of Families in Succession Decisions and PerformanceBennedsen, Morten; Nielsen, Kasper; Pérez-González, Francisco; Wolfenzon, Daniel (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper uses a unique dataset from Denmark to investigate (1) the role of family characteristics in corporate decision making, and (2) the consequences of these decisions on firm performance. We focus on the decision to appoint either a family or an external chief executive officer (CEO). We show that a departing CEO’s family characteristics have a strong predictive power in explaining CEO succession decisions: family CEOs are more frequently selected the larger the size of the family, the higher the ratio of male children and when the departing CEOs had only had one spouse. We then analyze the impact of family successions on performance. We overcome endogeneity and omitted variables problems of previous papers in the literature by using the gender of a departing CEO’s first-born child as an instrumental variable (IV) for family successions. This is a plausible IV as male first-child family firms are more likely to pass on control to a family CEO than female first-child firms, but the gender of the first child is unlikely to affect firms' performance. We find that family successions have a dramatic negative causal impact on firm performance: profitability on assets falls by at least 6 percentage points around CEO transitions. These estimates are significantly larger than those obtained using ordinary least squares. Finally, our findings demonstrate that professional nonfamily CEOs provide extremely valuable services to the organizations they work for. JEL classification: G32, G34, M13 Keywords: family firms, successions, CEO turnover, governance URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7594 Files in this item: 1
wp21-2005.pdf (249.7Kb) -
Samfundsøkonomisk analyse af anbefalingerne i "Report of the high level group of company law experts on issues related to takeover bids" (winter-rapporten)Bennedsen, Morten; Nielsen, Kasper (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Winter-rapporten identificerer to grundlæggende principper. 1) Proportionalitetsprincippet: Der skal være proportionalitet mellem den ultimative økonomiske risiko, som investorer påtager sig, og den kontrol disse opnår i virksomheden. 2) Aktionærprincippet: I tilfælde af et overtagelsesforsøg skal den ultimative beslutningsret ligge hos aktionærerne. I afsnit 1.1 analyseres hvor synlige disse to principper er i praksis i Danmark. Det vurderes at proportionalitetsprincippet ikke er implementeret. Det påvises at minimum halvdelen af de børsnoterede danske virksomheder har organiseret sig med flere aktieklasser og/eller begrænsinger på ejerskab eller stemmeafgivelsen. Graden af hvor meget anvendelsen af aktieklasser bryder med proportionalitetsprincippet, afhænger af, hvor stor en del af aktiemassen de kontrollerende aktionærer besidder. Vi påviser, at for virksomheder med flere aktieklasser bliver brugen af forskellige aktieklasser en mekanisme til at implementere en koncentreret kontrolstruktur uden at have en tilsvarende koncentreret cash flow fordeling. I Danmark har aktionærerne den endelige beslutningskompetence i forbindelse med et overtagelsesforsøg, hvorfor aktionærprincippet som udgangspunkt er implementeret. Ligeledes implicerer den koncentrerede kontrolstruktur, at kontrollerende aktionærer vil have reel indflydelse i en given overtagelsessituation. Det påpeges dog at der kan være grupper af ikke-kontrollerende aktionærer med betydelige andele af aktiemassen, der reelt holdes udenfor beslutningsprocessen i forbindelse med virksomhedsovertagelser. I afsnit 1.2 til 1.4 analyseres sammenhængen mellem de to principper og beskyttelsen af investorer i Danmark. En fuldstændig indførelse af proportionalitetsprincippet vil føre til betydelige organisationsændringer i mange danske børsnoterede virksomheder. En konsekvent gennemførelse af aktionær- og proportionalitetsprincippet vil markant øge beskyttelsen af ikke-kontrollerende aktionærgrupper i Danmark. Ligeledes formodes det at mindske de nuværende kontrollerende aktionærers kontrol med virksomhederne og i yderste fald ændre på hvilke aktionærgrupper, der er kontrollerende, og hvilke der er ikke-kontrollerende. Derudover er det et åbent spørgsmål, om f.eks. medarbejderrepræsentation er konsistent med proportionalitetsprincippet. Det vurderes at en reel gennemførelse af de to principper vil øge niveauet for investorbeskyttelse i Danmark, selvom denne størrelse er vanskeligt at definere. Det vurderes at beskyttelsen af investorer i Danmark er ringere end i lande som vi normalt sammenligner os med. Ved en øgning af dette niveau vil der opnås en række positive effekter især på aktiviteten på kapitalmarkedet. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7518 Files in this item: 1
wpec152002.pdf (401.4Kb) -
konsekvenser af at harmonisere selskabslovgivningen i EuropaBennedsen, Morten; Dam, Thea; Herby, Jonas; Nielsen, Kasper (, 2003)[More information][Less information]
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effekter af at harmonisere selskabslovgivningen i EUBennedsen, Morten; Nielsen, Kasper (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
Now showing items 1-8 of 8