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Limits on Economic Harmonization in The United States and The European UnionSweeney, Richard J. (København, 2003)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: The U.S. Constitution importantly limits the degree to which the federal government can impose harmonization across member states. This paper reviews these limitations and how they have evolved substantially over time in the U.S. It also discusses some of the benefits and costs of such limitations, and argues that the EU may benefit from adopting similar limitations. Harmonization of EU tax codes is likely to be economically harmful. On theoretical grounds, tax rates are likely to be harmonized at a common rate that is higher than optimal for the EU. This suggests the benefits of constitutional provisions that make tax harmonization difficult to impose. Other types of harmonization have a less clear-cut costbenefit analysis. A federal commercial code that is uniform across member states reduces transaction and information costs, compared to leaving important code issues to member states; further, many states may keep codes for long periods that are sub-optimal compared to a given federal code. A federal code may, however, fit poorly with other institutions of member states, potentially causing large costs. Leaving codes to the states leads to competition across states, and may generate forces for change for the better. Competition also generates information about the effectiveness and costs of different commercial codes. Because any country’s initial code is likely to be sub-optimal, and is likely to become less optimal over time, information on how to improve codes is valuable. Likely it is easier to learn and adapt from member states than from other countries. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6806 Filer i denne post: 1
wplefic112003.pdf (374.9Kb) -
Lessons for the EU from United States History, 1789 - 1861Sweeney, Richard J. (København, 2003)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: If secession or expulsion ends in a "velvet divorce," as with Czechoslovakia, costs are minimal and the split is relatively unimportant. High costs arise if a federation splits into mutually hostile, comparably sized regions. Perhaps the majority of splits lead to dangerous hostility. A well-designed constitution minimizes the likelihood of hostile splits by limiting the issues that are dealt with at the federal level, by providing checks and balances, and by establishing due process under the rule of law. Preventing the conditions under which a hostile split may arise is more costeffective than trying to optimize the terms of a split or to find last-minute compromises to forestall the split. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6786 Filer i denne post: 1
wplefic122003.pdf (396.6Kb) -
Lessons from the Causes of the American RevolutionSweeney, Richard J. (København, 2003)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: Because the conflicts that led to the American Revolution mainly arose from constitutional issues, the history of these conflicts offers lessons for the design of the new European Union constitution. One lesson is the importance of avoiding needless conflicts between federal and member-state governments. In particular, forcing decisions on where sovereignty lies may cause great conflict. Another lesson is that a federal system depends on good will among the federal and member-state governments, and because this good will is easily dissipated, efforts should be made to nurture it. Federal exercise of power will often alienate member states; thus, a sensible strategy is to grant the federal government only the minimal powers that a strong consensus agrees it must have, and to change these powers only by strong consensus. Removing "democratic deficits" may not be sufficient in many cases to give legitimacy to exercise of federal power; minorities may require protection by constitutional limits on federal powers. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6782 Filer i denne post: 1
wplefic102003.pdf (372.3Kb)
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