Artiklen indeholder en diskussion af Værdipapirhandelslovens forbud mod
insider handel. Der redegøres for tesen om effektive markeder. Med
udgangspunkt i økonomisk teori redegøres for argumenter for et forbud. Der
argumenteres for at, at insiderforbudets økonomiske berettigelsen med
fordel kan støttes på tesen om effektive markeder. Det er i modsætning
hertil blevet gjort gældende i den nyeste børsretlige teori, at den
økonomiske teori om effektive markeder ikke er et adækvat grundlag for
insider reglerne, og at denne teori bør erstattes af den såkaldte Lemon-teori,
formuleret af Akerlof. Artiklen gør gældende, at det ikke er uden problemer
at overføre Akerlof’s teori til de finansielle markeder, eftersom der ikke
tages hensyn til markedets selvregulerende mekanismer, som mindsker
problemet med asymmetrisk information. Artiklen afsluttes med en
diskussion af de reguleringsmæssige konsekvenser som følge af valg af det
økonomiske grundlag for insiderforbudet.
Abstract:
Proponents of specific performance as a remedy for breach of
contract have found support in the alleged use of the remedy in
Civil Law countries. However, we provide evidence that specific
performance is in fact a rare remedy in Denmark, Germany and
France, and under CISG, when performance requires actions to be
undertaken, and we relate this to costs of enforcement. We argue
that it is administratively costly to run a system of enforcement
that renders specific performance attractive to the aggrieved party,
and that the Civil Law countries have (like Common Law countries)
chosen not to incur these costs of enforcement. This is especially
clear in the case of Denmark, where specific performance of actions
has been abandoned as a legal remedy.
At the normative level, we argue that enforcement costs provides
an additional rationale, over and above the rationales of the theory
of efficient breach, for damages and against specific performance
as the general remedy.
