This paper draws on ideas in economics and game theory to develop a new theory of marketing and corporate communication in the emerging network economy. We argue that in a network economy, firms and consumers will confront "coordination problems." With the emerging network economy all this become urgent because the availability and cost of information decreases. Also, timing issues becomes crucial as millions of people get access to the same information simultaneously. That explain why events where masses of viewers simultaneously participate in the same events become so important. We introduce a simple game theoretic model to explain this, and discuss marketing applications and possible strategies.
Key words
Coordination problems, common knowledge, corporate communication
In this paper we analyze the construction of corporate social responsibility in the business press as an act of strategic ambiguity. While corporate social responsibility (CSR) generally evokes positive associations in public opinion, this paper demonstrates that these associations are based on a broadly encompassing and ambiguous definition of CSR. Our empirical data shows how the business press in its discourse on CSR provides no clarity on the definition of CSR in terms of a coherent motive, a dominant stakeholder or a consistent issue, but rather maintains ambiguity and imprecision about the meaning and content of CSR. While ambiguity and imprecision may be seen as an act of uncertainty in a passing stage when a new phenomenon emerges and develops, our longitudinal data demonstrates how ambiguity is preserved during a ten year period in four different daily newspapers. Ambiguity is systematically maintained in the business press. We refer to this process as strategic ambiguity. The paper discusses the potential value and limitations of framing CSR in a state of strategic ambiguity in the context of the concurrent rethinking of the role of business in modern welfare societies.
