http://hdl.handle.net/10398/106 2013-06-20T10:10:42Z 2013-06-20T10:10:42Z Reitzig, Markus Henkel, Joachim Heath, Christopher http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6827 2009-08-06T12:34:57Z 2004-06-15T00:00:00Z

Who Really Profits from Patent Infringements? Reitzig, Markus; Henkel, Joachim; Heath, Christopher Abstract: This paper contributes to the fundamental discussion of setting optimal liabilities in restitution law by analyzing the effects that the existing multitude of indemnification rules for patent infringements have on innovative and imitative activity. From a theoretical legal standpoint, the choice of patent law is particularly enlightening due to its hybrid public and private nature. From an economic perspective its relevance lies in regulating the driving forces of welfare in highly industrialized societies. Our analysis of regulations from six different jurisdictions (US, JP, DE, UK, FR, NL) reveals that from a scholarly standpoint none of the regulations sets optimal liabilities in general. Our major finding is that an expectation damage rule based on a renegotiation outcome from an ex-ante perspective (falling in between the generic legal notions of ‘lost profits’ and ‘infringer’s profits’) between licensor and licensee appears optimal in patent infringement cases to avoid dynamic inefficiencies. The result is intuitive, however, was not predicted by the existing literature on indemnification law. Keywords: Patents, litigation, damage awards, innovation, infringement JEL-Classifications: K41,L00, L20

2004-06-15T00:00:00Z Lando, Henrik Shavell, Steven http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6826 2011-09-08T10:10:49Z 2002-10-25T00:00:00Z

The advantage of focusing law enforcement effort Lando, Henrik; Shavell, Steven

2002-10-25T00:00:00Z Lando, Henrik http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6828 2011-09-08T10:10:57Z 2005-12-09T00:00:00Z

On the optimal negligence standard in tort law when one party is a long-run and the other a short-run player Lando, Henrik

2005-12-09T00:00:00Z Cumming, Douglas J. http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6825 2009-08-06T12:33:56Z 2004-06-15T00:00:00Z

Contracts and Exits in Venture Capital Finance Cumming, Douglas J. Contracts and exits from a sample of 179 investment rounds in 132 entrepreneurial firms by 17 European venture capital (VC) funds are analyzed. The data indicate the financial contracts are quite heterogeneous in terms of both the cash flow and control rights. The use of different securities by European VC funds does not depend on the definition of venture capital, and the securities used are not functional equivalents. A normative empirical analysis of exit shows the likelihood of different types of exit vehicles (IPO, acquisition, and liquidation) and the returns to venture capital depend on not only firm specific characteristics but also the allocation of cash flow and control rights. Keywords: Venture Capital, Financial Contracting, Exit, IPO, Acquisition JEL Classification: G24, G28, G31, G32, G35

2004-06-15T00:00:00Z