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<title>Ph.D. theses (INT)</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10398/82" rel="alternate"/>
<subtitle/>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10398/82</id>
<updated>2013-05-18T06:53:04Z</updated>
<dc:date>2013-05-18T06:53:04Z</dc:date>
<entry>
<title>The Owners and the Power</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8460" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Strand, Therese</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8460</id>
<updated>2012-06-25T08:20:40Z</updated>
<published>2012-06-25T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">The Owners and the Power
Strand, Therese
This thesis consists of five empirical studies, all relating to shareholder activism at annual&#13;
general meetings.&#13;
The first study concerns the structure and content of general meetings in Denmark and Sweden&#13;
comparatively. The paper reveals significant differences in the level of activism, with Swedish&#13;
investors being the most active in terms of proposals, proxy voting, and ‘voice’. The paper takes&#13;
a legal approach, and discusses divergence in activism levels from the perspective of shareholder&#13;
prerequisites to engage in monitoring efforts. Further, the paper investigating the topics&#13;
addressed through questions and opinions. The results show that matters which can be&#13;
categorized as irrelevant are reasonably rare. This is an important finding, as suggestions to&#13;
abolish general meetings have often been based on the assumption that general meetings&#13;
facilitate nothing but irrelevant, time consuming, and costly discussions that serves no&#13;
monitoring function.&#13;
The second study analyses the impact of voting power on shareholder activism. We hypothesize&#13;
that there is a positive relationship between shareholder activism and a measure of the largest&#13;
shareholder’s sensitivity to increased participation by small shareholders and find that firms’&#13;
amenability to small shareholder influence leads to more proposals by the nomination&#13;
committee, but fewer proposals by other shareholders. We interpret this as evidence that the&#13;
shareholder elected nomination committees effectively channel shareholder concerns and&#13;
preempt other kinds of activism. Politicians and companies that desire active shareholders could&#13;
improve the amenability of firms to shareholder influence by ownership transparency,&#13;
shareholder committees, and contacts with shareholder associations and other vehicles for&#13;
collective action...
</summary>
<dc:date>2012-06-25T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Toward an Integrative Framework of National Competitiveness</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8357" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Li, Xin</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8357</id>
<updated>2011-10-31T11:41:04Z</updated>
<published>2011-10-31T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Toward an Integrative Framework of National Competitiveness
Li, Xin
The starting point of this PhD research is two observations. The first is that people often tend to&#13;
discuss a country’s national competitiveness in a general tone, i.e., judging a country to be either&#13;
competitive or uncompetitive, rather than making more balanced assessment, and therefore their&#13;
opinions often contradict each other. The second observation is that there are many competing&#13;
international reports that rank a large number of countries in terms of their national competitiveness.&#13;
These reports often provide different rankings for a given country (e.g., China), and therefore the&#13;
readers of these reports are often left with a confusing picture. The first observation reflects the&#13;
reality that there has been a lack of commonly accepted definition of national competitiveness. The&#13;
second reflects the methodological problems of the indexing-and-ranking methods commonly used&#13;
by international competitiveness reports...
</summary>
<dc:date>2011-10-31T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Governance Failure and Iceland’s Financial Collapse</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8336" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Sigurjonsson, Throstur Olaf</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8336</id>
<updated>2011-09-09T12:42:48Z</updated>
<published>2011-09-09T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Governance Failure and Iceland’s Financial Collapse
Sigurjonsson, Throstur Olaf
Currently, the corporate governance has the agenda of categorizing reality and&#13;
thereby determining which systems are more effective and efficient in a given&#13;
context. A question is posed; how has the internationalization of markets,&#13;
liberalization, deregulation, and privatization adapted to rapid changes in&#13;
traditionally based models of corporate governance? When corporate governance&#13;
practices are exported from one country to another, they tend to be translated and&#13;
customized to local practices before being adopted. The objective of this thesis is&#13;
to examine this type of adaptation and explain the circumstances that led to a&#13;
collapse of governance mechanisms, using Iceland as an example.
</summary>
<dc:date>2011-09-09T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Brand Thrust: Strategic Branding and Shareholder Value</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8022" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Ohnemus, Lars</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8022</id>
<updated>2010-03-10T14:07:27Z</updated>
<published>2010-03-10T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Brand Thrust: Strategic Branding and Shareholder Value
Ohnemus, Lars
</summary>
<dc:date>2010-03-10T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
</feed>
