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<title>Working Papers (SMG)</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10398/97" rel="alternate"/>
<subtitle/>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10398/97</id>
<updated>2013-06-19T18:03:59Z</updated>
<dc:date>2013-06-19T18:03:59Z</dc:date>
<entry>
<title>Agency Theory</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8693" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Linder, Stefan</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Foss, Nicolai J.</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8693</id>
<updated>2013-05-07T09:16:46Z</updated>
<published>2013-05-07T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Agency Theory
Linder, Stefan; Foss, Nicolai J.
Agency theory studies the problems and solutions linked to delegation of tasks from&#13;
principals to agents in the context of conflicting interests between the parties. Beginning from&#13;
clear assumptions about rationality, contracting and informational conditions, the theory&#13;
addresses problems of ex ante (“hidden characteristics”) as well as ex post information&#13;
asymmetry (“hidden action”), and examines conditions under which various kinds of&#13;
incentive instruments and monitoring arrangements can be deployed to minimize the welfare&#13;
loss. Its clear predictions and broad applicability have allowed agency theory to enjoy&#13;
considerable scientific impact on social science; however, it has also attracted considerable&#13;
criticism. [99 words]
</summary>
<dc:date>2013-05-07T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Organizations and Markets</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8692" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Foss, Nicilai J.</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Klein, Peter G.</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Linder, Stefan</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8692</id>
<updated>2013-05-06T11:53:30Z</updated>
<published>2013-05-06T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Organizations and Markets
Foss, Nicilai J.; Klein, Peter G.; Linder, Stefan
Austrian economics focuses on markets, but has much to say about organizations. In&#13;
particular, Austrian insights on the structure of production, the heterogeneity and&#13;
subjectivity of resources, the nature of uncertainty, the role of monetary calculation,&#13;
and the function of the entrepreneur provide solid foundations for a distinctly&#13;
Austrian theory of organizations. We review these insights, discuss recent literature&#13;
on Austrian economics and the theory of the firm, and suggest new directions for&#13;
developing and extending an Austrian approach to organizations.
</summary>
<dc:date>2013-05-06T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>The Role of External Knowledge Sources and Organizational Design in the Process of Opportunity Exploitation</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8680" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Foss, Nicolai J.</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Lyngsie, Jacob</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Zahra, Shaker A.</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8680</id>
<updated>2013-04-16T07:44:36Z</updated>
<published>2013-04-16T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">The Role of External Knowledge Sources and Organizational Design in the Process of Opportunity Exploitation
Foss, Nicolai J.; Lyngsie, Jacob; Zahra, Shaker A.
Research highlights the role of external knowledge sources in the recognition of strategic opportunities, but is less forthcoming with respect to the role of such sources during the process of exploiting or realizing opportunities. We build on the knowledge-based view to propose that realizing opportunities often involves significant interactions with external knowledge sources. Organizational design can facilitate a firm’s interactions with these sources, while achieving coordination among organizational members engaged in opportunity exploitation. Our analysis of a double-respondent survey involving 536 Danish firms shows that the use of external knowledge sources is positively associated with opportunity exploitation, but the strength of this association is significantly influenced by organizational designs that enable the firm to access external knowledge during the process of exploiting opportunities.
</summary>
<dc:date>2013-04-16T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Micro-Foundations for Strategy</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8668" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Foss, Nicolai J.</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Lindenberg, Siegwart</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8668</id>
<updated>2013-03-26T09:36:15Z</updated>
<published>2013-03-26T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Micro-Foundations for Strategy
Foss, Nicolai J.; Lindenberg, Siegwart
Scholars increasingly seek to proffer microfoundations for macro management theory, notably strategic management theory. These microfoundations naturally revolve around human resources. We argue that proper microfoundations for strategic management theory must recognize that the management of motivation is first and foremost a matter of the management of cognitions of organizational members, an insight that we found in goal-framing theory, an emerging perspective based on cognitive science, behavioral economics, and social psychology. Building on this insight, we argue that a key reason why strategic goals matter to firm performance──that is, firm-level value creation and value capture and sustained competitive heterogeneity──is that such goals influence value creation rooted in employee motivations. Unfolding this idea allows us to generate new insight in the relations between value creation, strategic leadership and strategic goals.
</summary>
<dc:date>2013-03-26T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
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