Browsing Departments by Author "Kolm, Ann-Sofie"
Now showing items 1-8 of 8
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Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: While examining the macroeconomic effects of government tax and punishment policies, this paper develops a three-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargaining. Workers are assumed to differ in ability, and the choice of education is determined endogenously. Job opportunities in an informal sector are available only to workers who choose not to acquire higher education. We find that increased punishment of informal activities increases the number of educated workers and reduces the number of unemployed workers. Considering welfare, we show it is optimal to choose punishment rates so to more than fully counteract the distortion created by the government’s inability to tax the informal sector. JEL-codes: H26, I21, J64 Keywords: Tax evasion, underground economy, education, matching, unemployment. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7558 Files in this item: 1
wpec122003.pdf (356.0Kb) -
Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe (Frederiksberg, 2011)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper develops a four sector equilibrium search and matching model with informal sector employment opportunities and educational choice. We show that underground activities reduce educational at- tainments if informal employment opportunities mainly are available to low educated workers. More zealous enforcement policy will in this case improve educational incentives as it reduces the attractiveness of remaining a low educated worker. Characterizing the optimal enforce- ment policies, we nd that relatively more audits should be targeted towards the sector employing low educated workers, elsewise a too low stock of educated workers is materialized. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8328 Files in this item: 1
Kolm_Larsen_WP_2-2011.pdf (309.1Kb) -
The Choice of Educational TypeAlstadsæter, Annette; Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper examines the effect of taxes on the individuals' choices of educational direction, and thus on the economy.s skill composition. A proportional labour tax induces too many workers with high innate ability to choose an educational type associated with high consumption value and low effort. This increases the skill mismatch and aggregate unemployment in the economy. The government can correct for this distortion by use of differentiated tuition fees or tax rates. JEL codes: J64, J68, H21, H24 Keywords: Unemployment, matching, education, optimal taxation, tuition fees URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7562 Files in this item: 1
wp23-2005.pdf (207.8Kb) -
Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2001)[More information][Less information]
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Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe (Frederiksberg, 2010)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper develops a general equilibrium search and matching model where an underground economy co-exists along with the formal part of the economy. In analyzing how tax and punishment policies a¤ect labour market performance, we find that punishment of infor- mal sector activities induce workers and firms to reallocate towards the formal sector. However, more importantly, we find that this real- location tends to improve e¢ ciency in search, reduce the overall wage pressure, and reduce actual unemployment. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8209 Files in this item: 1
wp5-2010.pdf (158.2Kb) -
Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: While examining the macroeconomic effects of increased government control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker- firm wage bargaining. Workers search for jobs in both the formal and the informal sector. We analyse the impact of higher punishment rates and a higher audit rate on labour market performance. We find that a higher punishment rate reduces the size of the informal sector and reduces unemployment. A higher audit rate has an ambiguous impact on unemployment, and may actually increase the size of the underground economy. JEL-codes: H26 Keywords: Tax evasion, underground economy, matching, bargaining, unemployment. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7487 Files in this item: 1
wpec112003.pdf (294.6Kb) -
Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2001)[More information][Less information]
Now showing items 1-8 of 8