Browsing Departments by Author "Mygind, Niels"
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Evidence from EstoniaJones, Derek C; Kalmi, Panu; Mygind, Niels (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In this paper we use rich panel data for a representative sample of Estonian enterprises to analyse diverse issues related to the determinants of ownership structures and ownership changes after privatisation. A key focus is to determine whether ownership changes are related to economic efficiency. While employee owned firms are found to be much more prone than other firms to switch ownership categories, often "employee owned" firms remain "insider-owned" as ownership passes from current employees to managers and former employees. Logit analyses of the determinants of ownership structures and ownership changes provides mixed support for several hypotheses. As predicted: (i) wealth and resource constraints play a crucial role in the determination of ownership, with foreigners buying firms with the highest equity levels and insiders buying firms with the lowest equity valuations; (ii) risk aversion explains subsequent ownership changes, especially away from employee ownership; (iii) allocation of ownership depends on the pre-privatisation origin and location of the firm, and these factors also influence subsequent ownership changes. Finally we compare our findings with those achieved by using more conventional approaches to analyze efficiency that use very similar data. Reassuringly the evidence presented in this paper is consistent with the view that efficiency considerations drive ownership changes (while earlier analysis for Estonia and for many other transition economies has identified the impact of ownership on economic performance.) However, the findings in this paper also establish that there are important influences besides economic efficiency that affect enterprise ownership and ownership changes. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6610 Files in this item: 1
wp560.pdf (577.5Kb) -
Theory and Evidence from the BalticsJones, Derek C.; Mygind, Niels (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We begin by identifying a typical governance life-cycle, defined as changes in ownership structure, and including both the identity of the major owner and ownership concentration. The cycle is marked by key events and phases including start-up, initial growth, mature growth, and possibly a crisis and restructuring stage or exit stage. The governance cycle for transitional countries reflects some specific characteristics –e.g. often privatization produces specific initial ownership structures, with an unusually high proportion of insider, especially, employee ownership. Subsequently pres-sures for restructuring produce strong impulses for ownership changes. There is limited possibility for external finance because of the embryonic development of the banking system and the capital markets during early transition. The governance cycle is also influenced by specific features of the institutional, cultural and economic environment in a country. The varying importance of these fac-tors is expected to produce differences in key features of ownership cycles such as the speed at which particular ownership changes occur. To provide simple hypothesis tests, we use new and rich enterprise panel data sets for the three Bal-tic countries. The data enable various measures of ownership to be constructed (including the iden-tity of major owners and ownership concentration). The empirical analysis covers the ownership cycle with emphasis on initial ownership and subsequent changes. Our key method is to assemble a series of transition matrices showing both starting and final ownership configurations for sample enterprises and to simultaneously provide information on changes in concentration for the largest single owner. For Estonia this is supplemented with an analysis of the frequencies of different own-ership-cycles including intermediary stages of ownership. In spite of important differences in insti-tutional development, especially concerning the privatization process, we find that governance cy-cles are broadly similar in all countries. Employee ownership is rapidly fading and mainly being succeeded by managerial ownership. There are changes back and forth between manager and do-mestic external ownership, while foreign ownership is quite stable. Ownership concentration is mostly increasing after privatization, which included diversification both to employees and external owners. Since ownership diversification did not sit well with the slow development of the institu-tional framework, as expected we see a subsequent concentration of ownership on both managers, external domestic and foreign owners. However, variation in institutions, there are also important differences across countries. The adjustment of ownership structures is faster in Estonia and this can be explained by the relatively fast pace of institutional change and evolution of important gov-ernance institutions, including tough bankruptcy legislation and advances in the financial system. JEL-codes: G3, J5, P2, P3 Keywords: corporate governance, life-cycle, privatization, ownership change, transition econo-mies, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania . URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6611 Files in this item: 1
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A Dynamic AnalysisHobdari, Bersant; Jones, Derek; Mygind, Niels (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: New and rich panel data for a large and representative sample of firms are used to estimate the sensitivity of access to capital to differing ownership structures. The investment behaviour of firms is examined in a dynamic setting in the presence of adjustment costs, liquidity constraints and imperfect competition. The empirical work is based on the derivation of Euler equations in the presence of symmetric and quadratic adjustment costs and both debt and equity constraints. Whereas the norm is to use ad hoc approaches to model these constraints, our alternative and more consistent leads to the inclusion of financial variables in investment equation in first differences rather than in levels. Our GMM estimates confirm the importance of financial factors in determining investment rates and suggest that firms owned by insiders, especially non-managerial employees, are more prone to be liquidity constrained than are others. Among the other groups, somewhat surprisingly, only domestic outsider owned firms display sensitivity to both measures of the availability of finance, with manager owned firms being sensitive to the availability of external finance, while state owned firms being sensitive to the availability of internal finance. Corporate Investment, Corporate Governance, Adjustment Costs, Liquidity Constraints, GMM Estimates, Transition Economies. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6585 Files in this item: 1
dynamicinvestmentpaper-2.pdf (381.1Kb) -
Evidence using stochastic frontier approachSinani, Evis; Jones, Derek C.; Mygind, Niels (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
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Hobdari, Bersant; Jones, Derek C.; Mygind, Niels (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Unlike previous empirical work in analyzing investment behavior and the determinants of liquidity constraints, we use a switching regression framework when sample separation is unknown and endogenous and firms are assumed to operate either in the financially constrained or in the financially unconstrained regime. The actual regime the firm is in is determined by a switching or selection function, which depends on those variables that theoretically determine the wedge between internal and external finance, the severity of information and agency problems and time-varying firm characteristics. By using new panel data for Estonian companies during 1993 through 1999 we find that: (i) separate regimes exist in investment behavior; (ii) the likelihood of being financially constrained is higher in firms that are recently privatized, small and where ownership is concentrated in the hands of insiders and the state; (iii) soft budget constraints lower the probability of a firm being financially constrained; (iv) the actual probabilities of operating in the financially constrained regime are calculated to be quite high and essentially stable during 1993-1999: 0.52-0.57 for state owned firms, 0.40-0.46 for domestic owned firms and 0.53-0.57 for employee owned firms; (v) ownership structure affects investment beyond its indirect effects through financial constraints. Corporate Investment, Liquidity Constraints, Insider Ownership, Switching Regression, Soft Budget Constraint. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6626 Files in this item: 1
switchingregressionpaper-1.pdf (418.7Kb) -
Mygind, Niels (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: With reference to the discussion about shareholder versus stakeholder maximization it is argued that the normal type of maximization is in fact stakeholder-owner maxi-mization. This means maximization of the sum of the value of the shares and stake-holder benefits belonging to the dominating stakeholder-owner. Maximization of shareholder value is a special case of owner-maximization, and only under quite re-strictive assumptions shareholder maximization is larger or equal to stakeholder-owner maximization. Broad stakeholder maximization is the sum of the returns to all stake-holders also including the shareholders of a company. Although it may be the ultimate goal for Corporate Social Responsibility to achieve this kind of maximization, broad stakeholder maximization is quite difficult to give a precise definition. There is no one-dimensional measure to add different stakeholder benefits not traded on the mar-ket, and therefore there is no possibility for practical application. Broad stakeholder maximization instead in practical applications becomes satisfying certain stakeholder demands, so that the practical application will be stakeholder-owner maximization un-der constraints defined by other stakeholders’ interests. These constraints vary for dif-ferent stakeholder owners and new standards for Corporate Social Responsibility and more active political consumers will strengthen these constraints. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6613 Files in this item: 1
share stake max wp53 2004.pdf (132.8Kb) -
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Abstract: This paper gives an overview over how far transition has proceeded and what is still lacking in the process. The analytical framework – the PIE model for Politics, Institutions, Economy – is introduced. The model is first used to point to the main reasons for the fall of the command economy. Then it is used to identify the barriers for transition of the institutional system and the restructuring of the economy. This includes an analysis of the different factors behind the steep fall in production in the first years of transition. It is shown that countries implementing a tough stabilization and a comprehensive and consequent liberalization have been most successful in the process. A fast and comprehensive privatization, on the other hand, has not been sufficient for the necessary restructuring of enterprises. Decisive for success in transition has been transformation of the state as a crucial part of the development of new political and economic institutions implementing well functioning, clear and stable rules of the game for private enterprises. The institutional development has been important for the attractiveness of foreign investments - important for restructuring enterprises as part of a positive circle for the transition process. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8486 Files in this item: 1
mygind_2011.pdf (115.2Kb) -
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Abstract: This paper gives an overview over how far transition has proceeded and what is still lacking in the process. First the analytical framework – the PIE model for Politics, Institutions, Economy – is introduces. The model is first used to point to the main reasons for the fall of the command economy. Then it is used to identify the barriers for transition of the institutional system and the restructuring of the economy. This includes an analysis of the different factors behind the steep fall in production in the first years of transition. It is shown that countries implementing a tough stabilization and a comprehensive and consequent liberalization have been most successful in the process. A fast and comprehensive privatization, on the other hand, has not been sufficient for the necessary restructuring of enterprises. Decisive for success in transition has been transformation of the state as a crucial part of the development of new political and economic institutions implementing well functioning, clear and stable rules of the game for private enterprises. The institutional development has been important for the attractiveness of foreign investments - important for restructuring enterprises as part of a positive circle for the transition process. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7983 Files in this item: 1
transition_-_PIE_feb_2009-1.pdf (108.5Kb)
Now showing items 1-8 of 8