Browsing Departments by Author "Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis"
Now showing items 1-12 of 12
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Nielsen, Søren Bo; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Schjelderup, Guttorm (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise's choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs – here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument –, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large. Keywords: Centralized vs. de-centralized decisions, taxes, MNEs. JEL-Classification: H25, F23, L23. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7652 Files in this item: 1
wp10-2005.pdf (164.5Kb) -
Schmitt, Nicolas; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We examine the interaction between commodity taxes and parallel imports in a simple two-country model with imperfect competition. While governments determine non-cooperatively their commodity tax rate, the volume of parallel imports is determined endogenously by the retailing sector. We compare the positive and normative implications of having commodity taxes based on destination or origin principle. Origin taxes are shown to have very attractive properties: they lead to lower levels of optimal taxes, they converge as parallel imports increase (while destination taxes diverge), and they lead to higher welfare levels. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7538 Files in this item: 1
wp.04.07.pdf (360.3Kb) -
Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Kreickemeier, Udo (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We show that the standard concertina result for tariff reforms – i.e. lowering the highest tariff increases welfare – no longer holds in general if we allow for international capital mobility. The result can break down if the good whose tariff is lowered is not capital intensive. If the concertina reform lowers welfare it lowers market access as well, thereby compromising a second goal that is typically connected with trade liberalisation. JEL-Classification: F11, F13, F15 Key words: Trade Policy Reform, International Factor Mobility, Welfare, Market Access URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7637 Files in this item: 1
wp5-2006.pdf (157.8Kb) -
Nielsen, Søren Bo; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Munich, 2001)[More information][Less information]
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Nielsen, Søren Bo; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Schjelderup, Guttorm (København, 2000)[More information][Less information]
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A Tax Optimality IndexRaimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Woodland, Alan D. (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper introduces an index of tax optimality that measures the distance of some current tax structure from the optimal tax structure in the presence of public goods. In doing so, we derive a [0, 1] number that reveals immediately how far the current tax configuration is from the optimal one and, thereby, the degree of efficiency of a tax system. We call this number the Tax Optimality Index. We show how the basic method can be altered in order to derive a revenue equivalent uniform tax, which measures the size of the public sector. A numerical example is used to illustrate the method developed. JEL Code: H21, H41. Keywords: Tax optimality index, excess burden, distance function. Authors Affiliations: Raimondos-Møller: Copenhagen Business School, CEPR, CESifo, and EPRU. Woodland: University of Sydney. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7534 Files in this item: 1
wpec052004.pdf (385.9Kb) -
Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Woodland, Alan D. (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper examines the welfare implications of non-discriminatory tariff reforms by a subset of countries, which we term a non-preferential trading club. We show that there exist coordinated tariff reforms, accompanied by appropriate income transfers between the member countries, that unambiguously increase the welfare of these countries while leaving the welfare of non-members unaltered. In terms of economic policy implications, our results show that there exist regional, MFN-consistent arrangements that lead to Pareto improvements in world welfare. JEL code: F15. Keywords: Trading clubs, non-preferential tariff reform, Kemp-Wan-Ohyama proposition. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7540 Files in this item: 1
wpec062004.pdf (262.2Kb) -
Mayer, Wolfgang; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Why do donor countries give foreign aid? The answers found in the literature are: (i) because donor countries care for recipient countries (e.g. altruism), and/or (ii) because there exist distortions that make the indirect gains from foreign aid (e.g. terms of trade effects) to be larger than the direct losses. This paper proposes a third answer to the above question, namely that aid is determined through the domestic political process of the donor country. The paper demonstrates how foreign aid affects the donor country’s income distribution and how, in a direct democracy, the majority of voters might benefit from foreign aid giving even though the country’s social welfare is reduced. JEL Classification: F35 Keywords: foreign aid, politics, majority voting. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7488 Files in this item: 1
1999_4.pdf (89.81Kb) -
Woodland, Alan D.; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper introduces the concept of a steepest ascent tariff reform for a small open economy. By construction, it is locally optimal in that it yields the highest gain in utility of any feasible tariff reform vector of the same length. Accordingly, it provides a convenient benchmark for the evaluation of the welfare effectiveness of other well known tariff reform rules, as e.g. the proportional and the concertina rules. We develop the properties of this tariff reform, characterize the sources of the potential welfare gains from tariff reform, use it to establish conditions under which some existing reforms are locally optimal, provide geometric illustrations and compare welfare effectiveness of reforms using numerical examples. Moreover, being a general concept, we apply it to the issue of market access and examine its implications. Overall, the paper’s contribution lies in presenting a theoretical concept where the focus is upon the size of welfare gains accruing from tariff reforms rather than simply with the direction of welfare effects that has been the concern of the literature. JEL code: F15. Keywords: Steepest ascent tariff reforms; piecemeal tariff policy; welfare; market access; small open economy. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7565 Files in this item: 1
wp4-2006.pdf (393.9Kb) -
Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Schjelderup, Guttorm; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We examine how a multinational’s choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure is affected by country tax differentials. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs — here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument —, we show that decentralization is preferred in case of small tax differentials, whereas centralization can be more profitable, when tax differentials are large. In essence, the organizational flexibility of MNEs is triggered by the scope for tax minimization. Our analysis allows for both commitment and non-commitment to transfer prices, and for alternative modes of competition. Keywords: Centralized vs. de-centralized decisions, taxes, transfer prices, MNEs. JEL-Classification: H25, F23, L23. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7509 Files in this item: 1
wp7-2006.pdf (234.3Kb) -
Nielsen, Søren Bo; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Schjelderup, Guttorm (København, 2001)[More information][Less information]
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An investigation on the performance of admission characteristicsla Cour, Lisbeth; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Now showing items 1-12 of 12