Browsing Departments by Author "Thomsen, Steen"
Now showing items 1-7 of 7
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Pedersen, Torben; Thomsen, Steen (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
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Pedersen, Torben; Thomsen, Steen (København, 2001)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The causal relationship between insider ownership and market valuation is tested by simultaneous estimation of the causes and effect of insider ownership among the largest continental European companies. Controlling for nation and industry effects insider ownership (measured by the fraction of "closely held" shares) is found to have a positive effect on market valuation (market-to-book values). And market valuation is found to have a positive feedback effect on the level of insider ownership. The findings provide empirical support for a theoretical model proposed by La Porta et al (1999). But the results are also found to be sensitive to owner identity: while a higher level of financial and corporate insider ownership is found to increase market valuation, family ownership has no significant effect, and a higher level of government ownership is found to reduce market valuation. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6535 Files in this item: 1
linkwp01-13.pdf (92.70Kb) -
Comparing networks and formal institutionsSinani, Evis; Thomsen, Steen; Staffsud, Anna; Randoy, Trond; Edling, Christofer (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
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Vinten, Frederik; Thomsen, Steen (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We analyze delistings from European stock exchanges 1995-2005 as a function of market conditions, firm effects and governance regulation. We find that investor protection and corporate governance quality reduce the likelihood of going private, bankrupt or liquidated, but increase the likelihood of exit by merger or acquisition. Taking into consideration that corporate governance policy may be endogenously determined, the estimated policy effects turn out to be highly sensitive to model specification, but our best estimates produce qualitatively similar results. We conclude that the evidence is most consistent with efficient regulation: better protection of minority investors and higher corporate governance quality stimulates the market for corporate control (M&A) and reduces the incentive to go private. However, going private transactions have increased significantly while governance standards have been improved over the past decade, and we would not ignore the possibility that more regulation would lead to more delistings. For example, we find indications that the adoption of corporate governance codes and changes in the level of corporate governance indices increase the propensity to go private. It seems likely that increasing investor protection will at some point add more costs than benefits to companies and investors. Governments should therefore consider both costs and benefits of further regulation. Key words: Delisting, public listing, mergers, acquisitions, bankruptcy, liquidation, going private, private equity, investor protection. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7504 Files in this item: 1
wp12-06.pdf (330.3Kb) -
US and EU EvidencePedersen, Torben; Thomsen, Steen; Kvist, Hans Kurt (København, 2001)[More information][Less information]
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do companies need owners?Thomsen, Steen; Rose, Caspar (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Foss, Nicolai Juul; Lando, Henrik; Thomsen, Steen (København, 1998)[More information][Less information]
Now showing items 1-7 of 7