Browsing Departments by Subject "skatteomgåelse"
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Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: While examining the macroeconomic effects of government tax and punishment policies, this paper develops a three-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargaining. Workers are assumed to differ in ability, and the choice of education is determined endogenously. Job opportunities in an informal sector are available only to workers who choose not to acquire higher education. We find that increased punishment of informal activities increases the number of educated workers and reduces the number of unemployed workers. Considering welfare, we show it is optimal to choose punishment rates so to more than fully counteract the distortion created by the government’s inability to tax the informal sector. JEL-codes: H26, I21, J64 Keywords: Tax evasion, underground economy, education, matching, unemployment. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7558 Files in this item: 1
wpec122003.pdf (356.0Kb) -
Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: While examining the macroeconomic effects of increased government control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker- firm wage bargaining. Workers search for jobs in both the formal and the informal sector. We analyse the impact of higher punishment rates and a higher audit rate on labour market performance. We find that a higher punishment rate reduces the size of the informal sector and reduces unemployment. A higher audit rate has an ambiguous impact on unemployment, and may actually increase the size of the underground economy. JEL-codes: H26 Keywords: Tax evasion, underground economy, matching, bargaining, unemployment. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7487 Files in this item: 1
wpec112003.pdf (294.6Kb)
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