Browsing Working Papers (LEFIC) by Title
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Now showing items 41-48 of 48
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Keuschnigg, Christian; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In this paper we set up a model of start-up finance under double moral hazard. Entrepreneurs lack own resources and business experience to develop their ideas. Venture capitalists can provide start-up finance and commercial support. The effort put forth by either agent contributes to the firm’s success, but is not verifiable. As a result, the market equilibrium is biased towards inefficiently low venture capital support. The capital gains tax becomes especially harmful, as it further impairs advice and causes a first-order welfare loss. Once the capital gains tax is in place, limitations on loss off-set may paradoxically contribute to higher quality of venture capital finance and welfare. Subsidies to physical investment in VC-backed startups are detrimental in our framework. Keywords: Venture capital, capital gains taxation, double moral hazard. JEL-Classification: D82, G24, H24, H25 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6821 Files in this item: 1
wplefic032003.pdf (694.8Kb) -
Motta, Massimo; Rønde, Thomas (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We show that when the researcher’s (observable but not contractible) contribution to innovation is crucial, a covenant not to compete (CNC) reduces effort and profits under both spot and relational contracts. Having no CNC allows the researcher to leave for a rival. This alleviates a commitment problem by forcing the firm to reward a successful researcher. However, if the firm’s R&D investment mainly matters, including a CNC in the contract is optimal, as it ensures the firm’s incentives to invest. JEL Codes: J3, K2, L14, O31, O34. Keywords: Innovation, intellectual property rights, labor contracts, poaching, relational contracts, start-ups. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6800 Files in this item: 1
wplefic122002.pdf (481.6Kb) -
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Abstract: This article studies the involuntary transfer of property rights by theft - a topic almost unexplored in the law and economics literature. The question is whether a buyer of a stolen good should obtain title to the good if he/she has purchased it in good faith. As described in the article different jurisdictions treat this issue differently. The traditional theory suggests that there is a tradeoff between the costs of protecting the good and the costs of verifying the ownership. However, as shown, the rule of law concerning this issue significantly affects parties’ incentives. Specifically, it is shown that a rule of law where good faith is irrelevant in determining the issue of property rights Pareto dominates a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer. Thus, an owner of an asset will spend more resources on protecting his property and potential buyers will incur higher costs in order to verify the ownership when good faith is decisive for the transfer of property rights. JEL Classification: K11, K14 and K42 Keywords: property right law, theft, good faith and game theory URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6802 Files in this item: 1
wplefic092005.pdf (324.7Kb) -
Wihlborg, Clas (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
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testing current theory on value drivers of innovations within a structural two-stage discrete choice simultaneous equation modelReitzig, Markus (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Patent indicators are widely used to assess innovative output. Despite the large variety of empirical studies in the field, however, the precise meaning of these indicators and their obvious relation to patent value is still based on assumptions and intuitions. This paper provides the first empirical test of patent indicators as value measures in the structural form. It disentangles the different effects reflected in patent indicators and enhances our understanding why inventions are valuable at all. Using a newly assembled data set on European polymer patents, current assumptions on the innovation incentives set by patentability requirements (novelty, inventive activity) are tested. The estimations are carried out using a custom-tailored two stage discrete choice probit model yet unknown in the literature. The results support the assumptions that novelty and inventive activity enhance a patent’s value. They confirm the importance of backward citations, family size, and forward citations as va lue indicators. However, they expand on and partly break with the respective explanations why patent indicators correlate with profitability. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6807 Files in this item: 1
wplefic012003.pdf (181.5Kb) -
Lando, Henrik (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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A comparative analysis of the explanatory power of accounting and patent information for the market values of German firmsRamb, Fred; Reitzig, Markus (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We present a theoretical and empirical analysis of the fitness of national German (German Commercial Code – Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB)) and international (IAS and US-GAAP) accounting information, as well as European patent data to explain the market values of German manufacturing firms. For the chosen volatile period from 1997 to 2002, cautious national accounting information does not correlate with the firms’ residual market values (RMV). International accounting information makes no meaningful contribution to explaining firms’ RMV and seems to measure overinvestment only. Finally, patents counted at the individual country level correlate with the firms’ RMV. Keywords: Accounting standards, investor information, market value, patents JEL-classifications: D82, M40, M41, K11 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6814 Files in this item: 1
wplefic072004.pdf (390.9Kb) -
A Comparative International Analysis of Innovation Incentives from Patent Indemnification RulesReitzig, Markus; Henkel, Joachim; Heath, Christopher (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Abstract: This paper contributes to the fundamental discussion of setting optimal liabilities in restitution law by analyzing the effects that the existing multitude of indemnification rules for patent infringements have on innovative and imitative activity. From a theoretical legal standpoint, the choice of patent law is particularly enlightening due to its hybrid public and private nature. From an economic perspective its relevance lies in regulating the driving forces of welfare in highly industrialized societies. Our analysis of regulations from six different jurisdictions (US, JP, DE, UK, FR, NL) reveals that from a scholarly standpoint none of the regulations sets optimal liabilities in general. Our major finding is that an expectation damage rule based on a renegotiation outcome from an ex-ante perspective (falling in between the generic legal notions of ‘lost profits’ and ‘infringer’s profits’) between licensor and licensee appears optimal in patent infringement cases to avoid dynamic inefficiencies. The result is intuitive, however, was not predicted by the existing literature on indemnification law. Keywords: Patents, litigation, damage awards, innovation, infringement JEL-Classifications: K41,L00, L20 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6827 Files in this item: 1
wplefic182002new.pdf (499.7Kb)
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Now showing items 41-48 of 48