Browsing Working Papers (LEFIC) by Author "Lando, Henrik"
Now showing items 1-11 of 11
-
Lando, Henrik; Shavell, Steven (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
-
Lando, Henrik (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: It is natural to suppose that delegation and incentives are complementary both in the sense that when more decisions are delegated to a lower level of an organizational hierarchy, more use should be made of incentives at that level, and in the sense that more use of incentives should be accompanied by more delegation. This issue is analyzed within a Principal-Agent framework in which there are two decisions to be made: an effort decision which can only be made by the Agent, and some other decision which can be made by either the Principal (i.e. be centralized) or by the Agent (i.e. be delegated). Within this framework it is shown that delegation and incentives are not necessarily complementary instruments; some decisions should be centralized when incentives are introduced. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6813 Files in this item: 1
lefic 2004-02.pdf (234.2Kb) -
A Law and Economics Perspective on Optimal ContractingLando, Henrik (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
-
Lando, Henrik (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Does wrongful conviction lower deterrence and can this explain society’s aversion to sanctioning the innocent? This paper argues that for some of the most important categories of crime such as murder, assault or robbery, the answer to both questions is no. For these categories of crime, a potential offender need not fear wrongful conviction for any particular criminal act he or she chooses not to commit. For example, if a potential offender decides not to murder another person, he or she should not fear being wrongfully convicted of it, since the person will not be dead, and there will therefore be no investigation and no trial. He of she may risk being wrongfully convicted of another crime, but that risk exists independently of his or her own actions. It may be argued that wrongful conviction lowers deterrence in more indirect ways. First, the possibility of being sanctioned for a crime one does not commit may lower the threat of being sanctioned for a crime one commits, if two sanctions are not twice as threatening as one. Second, if wrongful conviction halts further investigations that may lead to the true offender, and third, if a potential offender thinks that if he or she does not take advantage of a crime opportunity, he or she may be wrongly convicted in the event that some other person grasps the same opportunity. However, it will be argued that wrongful conviction may also increase deterrence, and the three indirect effects are in any event unlikely to be quantitatively important in the real world. An implication of the present analysis is that society’s aversion to sanctioning the innocent cannot be rationalized by or reduced to a concern for deterrence. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6803 Files in this item: 1
wplefic092004rev2.pdf (163.7Kb) -
Lando, Henrik (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This article compares a set of often used simple contracts or mechanisms in terms of how well they allocate decision rights between two agents over time. A basic assumption is that agents incur a fixed cost each time they renegotiate. The contracts or mechanisms studied are: individual ownership and authority, the first-come first-serve rule, the alternating rule and the sign-up rule. One trade-off that arises is the following: when usage of the asset is flexible in the sense that it does not matter in which period it occurs, agents may rely on obtaining the asset through arriving first at some point, while when an agent needs to time and plan the use of the asset, he or she may wish to hold stronger rights or to use the sign-up rule as a simple form of contracting. (JEL:D10, D23, L22); Keywords: Incomplete contracts, individual ownership,first-come first-serve rule, costly renegotiation. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6815 Files in this item: 1
wplefic012004.pdf (658.9Kb) -
Lando, Henrik; Rose, Caspar (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Abstract: Proponents of specific performance as a remedy for breach of contract have found support in the alleged use of the remedy in Civil Law countries. However, we provide evidence that specific performance is in fact a rare remedy in Denmark, Germany and France, and under CISG, when performance requires actions to be undertaken, and we relate this to costs of enforcement. We argue that it is administratively costly to run a system of enforcement that renders specific performance attractive to the aggrieved party, and that the Civil Law countries have (like Common Law countries) chosen not to incur these costs of enforcement. This is especially clear in the case of Denmark, where specific performance of actions has been abandoned as a legal remedy. At the normative level, we argue that enforcement costs provides an additional rationale, over and above the rationales of the theory of efficient breach, for damages and against specific performance as the general remedy. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6823 Files in this item: 1
wplefic142003new2.pdf (270.4Kb) -
Lando, Henrik (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
-
Lando, Henrik (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The standard of proof in criminal law a®ects retributive justice through the number of wrong convictions and wrong acquittals. It also a®ects the level of crime, since a higher standard of proof implies less deterrence and less incapacitation. This article derives an expression for the optimal standard from a trade-o® between these e®ects, and applies the expression to the crime of sexual violation against women. For this crime, social preferences for justice versus prevention of crime are elicited through a survey and inserted into the expression for the optimal standard. The result indicates that the concern for prevention of crime may have a signi¯cant e®ect on the optimal standard of proof. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6785 Files in this item: 1
wplefic042003.pdf (634.2Kb) -
Lando, Henrik (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
-
Lando, Henrik (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The paper argues that society should vary the sanction applied to a criminal defendant with the weight of the evidence against him or her. This is optimal when it is costly for society to apply sanctions, since it can yield the same degree of deterrence while requiring fewer resources to be spent on sanctioning. Furthermore, when the unfairness of convicting an innocent defendant increases with the size of the sanction, this provides a further rationale for graduating sanctions with the probability of guilt. Some objections are briefly discussed, mainly that it is inherently unfair to apply different sanctions on people, who have committed the same offense, and that the legal system will lose legitimacy if it allows sanctions to vary in the way suggested. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6820 Files in this item: 1
wplefic082004.pdf (289.7Kb) -
Lando, Henrik (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
Now showing items 1-11 of 11