Browsing Working Papers (LEFIC) by Subject "usa"
Now showing items 1-5 of 5
-
Limits on Economic Harmonization in The United States and The European UnionSweeney, Richard J. (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The U.S. Constitution importantly limits the degree to which the federal government can impose harmonization across member states. This paper reviews these limitations and how they have evolved substantially over time in the U.S. It also discusses some of the benefits and costs of such limitations, and argues that the EU may benefit from adopting similar limitations. Harmonization of EU tax codes is likely to be economically harmful. On theoretical grounds, tax rates are likely to be harmonized at a common rate that is higher than optimal for the EU. This suggests the benefits of constitutional provisions that make tax harmonization difficult to impose. Other types of harmonization have a less clear-cut costbenefit analysis. A federal commercial code that is uniform across member states reduces transaction and information costs, compared to leaving important code issues to member states; further, many states may keep codes for long periods that are sub-optimal compared to a given federal code. A federal code may, however, fit poorly with other institutions of member states, potentially causing large costs. Leaving codes to the states leads to competition across states, and may generate forces for change for the better. Competition also generates information about the effectiveness and costs of different commercial codes. Because any country’s initial code is likely to be sub-optimal, and is likely to become less optimal over time, information on how to improve codes is valuable. Likely it is easier to learn and adapt from member states than from other countries. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6806 Files in this item: 1
wplefic112003.pdf (374.9Kb) -
Some Lessons from United States Constitutional HistorySweeney, Richard J. (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: A constitution is more likely to be accepted if it federalizes those issues that are widely seen as needing complete harmonization. A constitution is more likely to endure if the federal government does not have powers that are not vital to it but which may alienate some member states to the point that the federal government loses legitimacy. It appears vital to have trade policy at the European Union level; for euro countries, monetary policy is already federalized. It is not clear that common foreign and defense policies are needed; insisting on common foreign and defense policies may lead to conflicts within and across member states that severely weaken the Union, conceivably contributing to eventual collapse. Insisting on harmonization of commercial codes does not have the destructive potential of attempting completely to harmonize defense and foreign policies; it may, however, lead to needless conflict that helps drain the reservoir of goodwill that the European Union will need for dealing with other conflicts amongst member states. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6787 Files in this item: 1
wplefic092003.pdf (442.7Kb) -
Lessons for the EU from United States History, 1789 - 1861Sweeney, Richard J. (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: If secession or expulsion ends in a "velvet divorce," as with Czechoslovakia, costs are minimal and the split is relatively unimportant. High costs arise if a federation splits into mutually hostile, comparably sized regions. Perhaps the majority of splits lead to dangerous hostility. A well-designed constitution minimizes the likelihood of hostile splits by limiting the issues that are dealt with at the federal level, by providing checks and balances, and by establishing due process under the rule of law. Preventing the conditions under which a hostile split may arise is more costeffective than trying to optimize the terms of a split or to find last-minute compromises to forestall the split. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6786 Files in this item: 1
wplefic122003.pdf (396.6Kb) -
Why Didn’t the U.S. Civil War Go On and On?Sweeney, Richard J. (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The post-Civil War reconciliation between the North and the South is a very rare event in the history of civil wars. The South was thoroughly beaten. Top generals, particularly Robert E. Lee, saw further fighting as "useless effusion of blood." There was no call by top Confederate leaders for continuing the fight with the type of bushwacking that occurred in Missouri and Kansas. Reconstruction is often thought of as harsh, but compared to the standards of history Confederates were by and large treated well after the Civil War. Within a decade or so of the end of the Civil War, conservative white elites had established political, economic and social dominance in the South. They had lost their "slave property" and the "government of our own." They could never get back slavery, and a government of their own was not worth fighting for. There was little reason for the kind of persistent low-level guerilla warfare that often occurs after civil wars, or the organization of a succession of rebellions. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6810 Files in this item: 1
wplefic132003.pdf (447.2Kb) -
Lessons from the Causes of the American RevolutionSweeney, Richard J. (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Because the conflicts that led to the American Revolution mainly arose from constitutional issues, the history of these conflicts offers lessons for the design of the new European Union constitution. One lesson is the importance of avoiding needless conflicts between federal and member-state governments. In particular, forcing decisions on where sovereignty lies may cause great conflict. Another lesson is that a federal system depends on good will among the federal and member-state governments, and because this good will is easily dissipated, efforts should be made to nurture it. Federal exercise of power will often alienate member states; thus, a sensible strategy is to grant the federal government only the minimal powers that a strong consensus agrees it must have, and to change these powers only by strong consensus. Removing "democratic deficits" may not be sufficient in many cases to give legitimacy to exercise of federal power; minorities may require protection by constitutional limits on federal powers. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6782 Files in this item: 1
wplefic102003.pdf (372.3Kb)
Now showing items 1-5 of 5