Browsing Centres by Author "Nielsen, Søren Bo"
Now showing items 1-4 of 4
-
Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
-
Keuschnigg, Christian; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In financing start-up firms, venture capitalists carefully select among alternative projects, design incentive compatible financial contracts and support portfolio companies with value enhancing managerial advice. This paper considers how venture capitalists can induce self-selection among entrepreneurial firms with different qualities by designing appropriate contracts and offering commercial support. We study the efficiency of the competitive market equilibrium with respect to the level and quality of entrepreneurship and the level of effort by entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. We also provide comparative statics results with respect to basic preference and technology parameters. Venture capital, entrepreneurship, self-selection, moral hazard. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7707 Files in this item: 1
artikel 07.pdf (407.6Kb) -
Keuschnigg, Christian; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In this paper we set up a model of start-up finance under double moral hazard. Entrepreneurs lack own resources and business experience to develop their ideas. Venture capitalists can provide start-up finance and commercial support. The effort put forth by either agent contributes to the firm’s success, but is not verifiable. As a result, the market equilibrium is biased towards inefficiently low venture capital support. The capital gains tax becomes especially harmful, as it further impairs advice and causes a first-order welfare loss. Once the capital gains tax is in place, limitations on loss off-set may paradoxically contribute to higher quality of venture capital finance and welfare. Subsidies to physical investment in VC-backed startups are detrimental in our framework. Keywords: Venture capital, capital gains taxation, double moral hazard. JEL-Classification: D82, G24, H24, H25 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6821 Files in this item: 1
wplefic032003.pdf (694.8Kb) -
Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: To examine the effects on labor market performance of government tax and enforcement policies, this paper develops an equilibrium model featuring tax evasion, matching frictions, and worker-firm wage bargains. In the wage bargains, workers and firms can agree on the amount of remuneration that should not be reported to the tax authorities. We find that increased taxation actually reduces unemployment, whereas more zealous enforcement has the opposite effect. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7699 Files in this item: 1
artikel 10.pdf (464.6Kb)
Now showing items 1-4 of 4