Centres Forfattere "Rønde, Thomas"
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Kaiser, Ulrich; Kongsted, Hans Christian; Rønde, Thomas (København, 2008)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: We measure the quantitative importance of labor mobility as a vehicle for the transmission of knowledge and skills across firms. For this purpose we create a unique data set that matches all applications of Danish firms at the European Patent Office to linked employer-employee register data for the years 1999-2002. The Danish workforce is split into "R&D workers", who hold a bachelor's or a master's degree in a technical field, and "non-R&D workers". We find that mobile R&D workers ("R&D joiners"') contribute more to patenting activity than immobile R&D workers. Furthermore, R&D workers who have previously been employed by a patenting firm ("patent exposed workers") have a larger effect on patenting activity than R&D workers without this experience. Patent exposed R&D joiners constitute the most productive group of workers: for firms that patented prior to 1999, one additional worker of this type relates to an increase in the number of patent applications of the new employer by 0.0646. This corresponds to a 14 percent increase in the mean number of yearly patent applications. We also find that mobility of R&D workers increases the joint patenting activity of the donor and recipient firms, confirming the importance of labor mobility for innovation in the economy. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7704 Filer i denne post: 1
dp 2008-16.pdf (363.9Kb) -
Fosfuri, Andrea; Rønde, Thomas (København, 2006)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: We study a situation in which an R&D department promotes the introduction of an innovation, which results in costly re-adjustments for production workers. In response, the production department tries to resist change by improving the existing technology. We show that firms balancing the strengths of the two departments perform better. This principle is employed to derive several implications concerning the hiring of talents, monetary incentives, and technology investment policies. As a negative effect, resistance to change might distort the R&D department’s effort away from radical innovations. The firm can solve this problem by implementing the so-called ”skunk works model” of innovation where the R&D department is isolated from the rest of the organization. Resistance to change, innovation, skunk works model, contest. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7691 Filer i denne post: 1
artikel 02.pdf (561.0Kb) -
Harr, Thomas; Rønde, Thomas (København, 2006)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: We study the optimal regulation of banking groups ("banks”), taking both minimum capital requirements and legal structure into account. A bank can set up either as one legal unit facing limited liability jointly (branch structure) or as a bank holding company with subsidiaries (subsidiary structure). Banks are exposed to risk from their unobservable asset choices and to exogenous risk from their environment. We show that banks with branches are more prudent in normal times than banks with subsidiaries, but are also less prudent when problems arise. A regulator that observes banks’ exogenous risk should optimally determine both capital requirements and legal structure. If the exogenous risk is private information to banks, it can be optimal to screen banks according to risk by setting capital requirements appropriately, and letting banks choose their legal structure. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7708 Filer i denne post: 1
artikel 01.pdf (717.4Kb) -
Motta, Massimo; Rønde, Thomas (København, 2002)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: We show that when the researcher’s (observable but not contractible) contribution to innovation is crucial, a covenant not to compete (CNC) reduces effort and profits under both spot and relational contracts. Having no CNC allows the researcher to leave for a rival. This alleviates a commitment problem by forcing the firm to reward a successful researcher. However, if the firm’s R&D investment mainly matters, including a CNC in the contract is optimal, as it ensures the firm’s incentives to invest. JEL Codes: J3, K2, L14, O31, O34. Keywords: Innovation, intellectual property rights, labor contracts, poaching, relational contracts, start-ups. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6800 Filer i denne post: 1
wplefic122002.pdf (481.6Kb)
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