Browsing Centres by Author "Rose, Caspar"
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Abstract: Artiklen indeholder en diskussion af Værdipapirhandelslovens forbud mod insider handel. Der redegøres for tesen om effektive markeder. Med udgangspunkt i økonomisk teori redegøres for argumenter for et forbud. Der argumenteres for at, at insiderforbudets økonomiske berettigelsen med fordel kan støttes på tesen om effektive markeder. Det er i modsætning hertil blevet gjort gældende i den nyeste børsretlige teori, at den økonomiske teori om effektive markeder ikke er et adækvat grundlag for insider reglerne, og at denne teori bør erstattes af den såkaldte Lemon-teori, formuleret af Akerlof. Artiklen gør gældende, at det ikke er uden problemer at overføre Akerlof’s teori til de finansielle markeder, eftersom der ikke tages hensyn til markedets selvregulerende mekanismer, som mindsker problemet med asymmetrisk information. Artiklen afsluttes med en diskussion af de reguleringsmæssige konsekvenser som følge af valg af det økonomiske grundlag for insiderforbudet. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6793 Files in this item: 1
wplefic152003.pdf (426.7Kb) -
Lando, Henrik; Rose, Caspar (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Abstract: Proponents of specific performance as a remedy for breach of contract have found support in the alleged use of the remedy in Civil Law countries. However, we provide evidence that specific performance is in fact a rare remedy in Denmark, Germany and France, and under CISG, when performance requires actions to be undertaken, and we relate this to costs of enforcement. We argue that it is administratively costly to run a system of enforcement that renders specific performance attractive to the aggrieved party, and that the Civil Law countries have (like Common Law countries) chosen not to incur these costs of enforcement. This is especially clear in the case of Denmark, where specific performance of actions has been abandoned as a legal remedy. At the normative level, we argue that enforcement costs provides an additional rationale, over and above the rationales of the theory of efficient breach, for damages and against specific performance as the general remedy. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6823 Files in this item: 1
wplefic142003new2.pdf (270.4Kb) -
a matter of contractual failuresRose, Caspar (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Abstract: This article analyzes the conflict of interests between shareholders and other stakeholders, including when such conflicts of interests may arise. It is argued that shareholder value cannot be justified simply by referring to any prerogative property rights of the shareholders. Instead, shareholder value coincides with the efficient hypothetical perfect contract. However, due to contractual failures in certain bargain situations, management may be unable to "internalize the firms externalities". This means that in these situations there is a tradeoff between a broad duty of loyalty for management in listed firms and other traditional remedies. The theoretical insights are applied on a case from the Danish Supreme Court (Louis Poulsen A/S) where the interests of the stakeholders were decisive. However, it is shown that the verdict may instead harm the relevant stakeholders illustrating how cautious the legal system should use a doctrine based on the "company’s interests". In addition, the notion of a firm’s social responsibility is critically evaluated together with the associated pitfalls of accepting this concept. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6796 Files in this item: 1
wplefic162003.pdf (375.9Kb) -
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Abstract: This article studies the involuntary transfer of property rights by theft - a topic almost unexplored in the law and economics literature. The question is whether a buyer of a stolen good should obtain title to the good if he/she has purchased it in good faith. As described in the article different jurisdictions treat this issue differently. The traditional theory suggests that there is a tradeoff between the costs of protecting the good and the costs of verifying the ownership. However, as shown, the rule of law concerning this issue significantly affects parties’ incentives. Specifically, it is shown that a rule of law where good faith is irrelevant in determining the issue of property rights Pareto dominates a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer. Thus, an owner of an asset will spend more resources on protecting his property and potential buyers will incur higher costs in order to verify the ownership when good faith is decisive for the transfer of property rights. JEL Classification: K11, K14 and K42 Keywords: property right law, theft, good faith and game theory URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6802 Files in this item: 1
wplefic092005.pdf (324.7Kb)
Now showing items 1-4 of 4