Center for Law, Economics & Financial Institutions (LEFIC) Titler
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Lando, Henrik; Rose, Caspar (København, 2003)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: Abstract: Proponents of specific performance as a remedy for breach of contract have found support in the alleged use of the remedy in Civil Law countries. However, we provide evidence that specific performance is in fact a rare remedy in Denmark, Germany and France, and under CISG, when performance requires actions to be undertaken, and we relate this to costs of enforcement. We argue that it is administratively costly to run a system of enforcement that renders specific performance attractive to the aggrieved party, and that the Civil Law countries have (like Common Law countries) chosen not to incur these costs of enforcement. This is especially clear in the case of Denmark, where specific performance of actions has been abandoned as a legal remedy. At the normative level, we argue that enforcement costs provides an additional rationale, over and above the rationales of the theory of efficient breach, for damages and against specific performance as the general remedy. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6823 Filer i denne post: 1
wplefic142003new2.pdf (270.4Kb) -
Eliasson, Gunnar; Wihlborg, Clas (København, 2003)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: The New Economy is closely associated with computing & communications technology, notably the Internet. We discuss property rights to, and trade in, the difficult-to-define intangible assets increasingly dominating the New Economy, and the possibility of under-investment in these assets. For a realistic analysis we introduce a Schumpeterian market environment (the experimentally organized economy). Weak property rights prevail when the rights to access, use, and trade in intangible assets cannot be fully exercised. The trade-off between the benefits of open access on the Internet, and the incentive effects of strengthened property rights, depend both on the particular strategy a firm employs to secure property rights, and the protection offered by law. Economic property rights can be strengthened if the originator can find innovative ways to charge for the intangible assets. The extreme complexity of the New Economy and the large number of possible innovative private contract arrangements make it more important to facilitate the use and enforcement of private individualized contracts to protect intellectual property than to rely only on standard mandatory patent and copyright law. Enabling law is one proposed solution. Current patent legislation in the US has led to costly litigation processes weakening the position of small firms and individuals in patent disputes. The property rights of such firms and individuals could be strengthened with insurance or arbitration procedures. Key words: Competence bloc theory, Enabling law, Experimentally Organized Economy, New Economy, Weak property rights, Tradability, Underinvestment. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6811 Filer i denne post: 1
wplefic052003.pdf (378.8Kb) -
Lando, Henrik (København, 2005)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
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Davis, Lee (København, 2002)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
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Lando, Henrik (København, 2003)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: The standard of proof in criminal law a®ects retributive justice through the number of wrong convictions and wrong acquittals. It also a®ects the level of crime, since a higher standard of proof implies less deterrence and less incapacitation. This article derives an expression for the optimal standard from a trade-o® between these e®ects, and applies the expression to the crime of sexual violation against women. For this crime, social preferences for justice versus prevention of crime are elicited through a survey and inserted into the expression for the optimal standard. The result indicates that the concern for prevention of crime may have a signi¯cant e®ect on the optimal standard of proof. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6785 Filer i denne post: 1
wplefic042003.pdf (634.2Kb) -
Lando, Henrik (København, 2005)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
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Lessons for the EU from United States History, 1789 - 1861Sweeney, Richard J. (København, 2003)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: If secession or expulsion ends in a "velvet divorce," as with Czechoslovakia, costs are minimal and the split is relatively unimportant. High costs arise if a federation splits into mutually hostile, comparably sized regions. Perhaps the majority of splits lead to dangerous hostility. A well-designed constitution minimizes the likelihood of hostile splits by limiting the issues that are dealt with at the federal level, by providing checks and balances, and by establishing due process under the rule of law. Preventing the conditions under which a hostile split may arise is more costeffective than trying to optimize the terms of a split or to find last-minute compromises to forestall the split. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6786 Filer i denne post: 1
wplefic122003.pdf (396.6Kb) -
Why Didn’t the U.S. Civil War Go On and On?Sweeney, Richard J. (København, 2003)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: The post-Civil War reconciliation between the North and the South is a very rare event in the history of civil wars. The South was thoroughly beaten. Top generals, particularly Robert E. Lee, saw further fighting as "useless effusion of blood." There was no call by top Confederate leaders for continuing the fight with the type of bushwacking that occurred in Missouri and Kansas. Reconstruction is often thought of as harsh, but compared to the standards of history Confederates were by and large treated well after the Civil War. Within a decade or so of the end of the Civil War, conservative white elites had established political, economic and social dominance in the South. They had lost their "slave property" and the "government of our own." They could never get back slavery, and a government of their own was not worth fighting for. There was little reason for the kind of persistent low-level guerilla warfare that often occurs after civil wars, or the organization of a succession of rebellions. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6810 Filer i denne post: 1
wplefic132003.pdf (447.2Kb) -
Lessons from the Causes of the American RevolutionSweeney, Richard J. (København, 2003)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: Because the conflicts that led to the American Revolution mainly arose from constitutional issues, the history of these conflicts offers lessons for the design of the new European Union constitution. One lesson is the importance of avoiding needless conflicts between federal and member-state governments. In particular, forcing decisions on where sovereignty lies may cause great conflict. Another lesson is that a federal system depends on good will among the federal and member-state governments, and because this good will is easily dissipated, efforts should be made to nurture it. Federal exercise of power will often alienate member states; thus, a sensible strategy is to grant the federal government only the minimal powers that a strong consensus agrees it must have, and to change these powers only by strong consensus. Removing "democratic deficits" may not be sufficient in many cases to give legitimacy to exercise of federal power; minorities may require protection by constitutional limits on federal powers. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6782 Filer i denne post: 1
wplefic102003.pdf (372.3Kb) -
Lando, Henrik (København, 2004)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: The paper argues that society should vary the sanction applied to a criminal defendant with the weight of the evidence against him or her. This is optimal when it is costly for society to apply sanctions, since it can yield the same degree of deterrence while requiring fewer resources to be spent on sanctioning. Furthermore, when the unfairness of convicting an innocent defendant increases with the size of the sanction, this provides a further rationale for graduating sanctions with the probability of guilt. Some objections are briefly discussed, mainly that it is inherently unfair to apply different sanctions on people, who have committed the same offense, and that the legal system will lose legitimacy if it allows sanctions to vary in the way suggested. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6820 Filer i denne post: 1
wplefic082004.pdf (289.7Kb) -
Wihlborg, Clas (København, 2004)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: The democratic deficit in the so-called bargaining democracy provides the motivation for constitutional efforts to limit the ability of different groups to form coalitions that are able to grant benefits to themselves through legislation that more or less directly benefit identifiable groups. A constitutional hierachy of laws that stand in conflict is proposed. In this hierarchy more "rule-oriented" legislation dominate less "rule-oriented" legislation. The main purpose of the proposal is to create a momentum of the political process towards more rule-oriented policy actions and legislation, and to inspire the policy debate to focus on principles and rules to an increasing extent. At the same time, the difficulty of defining a rule as opposed to an outcome-oriented directive is avoided by limiting the task of a constitutional court to simply rank conflicting policy actions with respect to the degree actions satisfy criteria for rules. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6791 Filer i denne post: 1
wplefic052004.pdf (195.8Kb) -
a matter of contractual failuresRose, Caspar (København, 2003)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: Abstract: This article analyzes the conflict of interests between shareholders and other stakeholders, including when such conflicts of interests may arise. It is argued that shareholder value cannot be justified simply by referring to any prerogative property rights of the shareholders. Instead, shareholder value coincides with the efficient hypothetical perfect contract. However, due to contractual failures in certain bargain situations, management may be unable to "internalize the firms externalities". This means that in these situations there is a tradeoff between a broad duty of loyalty for management in listed firms and other traditional remedies. The theoretical insights are applied on a case from the Danish Supreme Court (Louis Poulsen A/S) where the interests of the stakeholders were decisive. However, it is shown that the verdict may instead harm the relevant stakeholders illustrating how cautious the legal system should use a doctrine based on the "company’s interests". In addition, the notion of a firm’s social responsibility is critically evaluated together with the associated pitfalls of accepting this concept. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6796 Filer i denne post: 1
wplefic162003.pdf (375.9Kb) -
Keuschnigg, Christian; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2003)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: In this paper we set up a model of start-up finance under double moral hazard. Entrepreneurs lack own resources and business experience to develop their ideas. Venture capitalists can provide start-up finance and commercial support. The effort put forth by either agent contributes to the firm’s success, but is not verifiable. As a result, the market equilibrium is biased towards inefficiently low venture capital support. The capital gains tax becomes especially harmful, as it further impairs advice and causes a first-order welfare loss. Once the capital gains tax is in place, limitations on loss off-set may paradoxically contribute to higher quality of venture capital finance and welfare. Subsidies to physical investment in VC-backed startups are detrimental in our framework. Keywords: Venture capital, capital gains taxation, double moral hazard. JEL-Classification: D82, G24, H24, H25 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6821 Filer i denne post: 1
wplefic032003.pdf (694.8Kb) -
Motta, Massimo; Rønde, Thomas (København, 2002)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: We show that when the researcher’s (observable but not contractible) contribution to innovation is crucial, a covenant not to compete (CNC) reduces effort and profits under both spot and relational contracts. Having no CNC allows the researcher to leave for a rival. This alleviates a commitment problem by forcing the firm to reward a successful researcher. However, if the firm’s R&D investment mainly matters, including a CNC in the contract is optimal, as it ensures the firm’s incentives to invest. JEL Codes: J3, K2, L14, O31, O34. Keywords: Innovation, intellectual property rights, labor contracts, poaching, relational contracts, start-ups. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6800 Filer i denne post: 1
wplefic122002.pdf (481.6Kb) -
[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: This article studies the involuntary transfer of property rights by theft - a topic almost unexplored in the law and economics literature. The question is whether a buyer of a stolen good should obtain title to the good if he/she has purchased it in good faith. As described in the article different jurisdictions treat this issue differently. The traditional theory suggests that there is a tradeoff between the costs of protecting the good and the costs of verifying the ownership. However, as shown, the rule of law concerning this issue significantly affects parties’ incentives. Specifically, it is shown that a rule of law where good faith is irrelevant in determining the issue of property rights Pareto dominates a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer. Thus, an owner of an asset will spend more resources on protecting his property and potential buyers will incur higher costs in order to verify the ownership when good faith is decisive for the transfer of property rights. JEL Classification: K11, K14 and K42 Keywords: property right law, theft, good faith and game theory URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6802 Filer i denne post: 1
wplefic092005.pdf (324.7Kb) -
Wihlborg, Clas (København, 2003)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
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testing current theory on value drivers of innovations within a structural two-stage discrete choice simultaneous equation modelReitzig, Markus (København, 2003)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: Patent indicators are widely used to assess innovative output. Despite the large variety of empirical studies in the field, however, the precise meaning of these indicators and their obvious relation to patent value is still based on assumptions and intuitions. This paper provides the first empirical test of patent indicators as value measures in the structural form. It disentangles the different effects reflected in patent indicators and enhances our understanding why inventions are valuable at all. Using a newly assembled data set on European polymer patents, current assumptions on the innovation incentives set by patentability requirements (novelty, inventive activity) are tested. The estimations are carried out using a custom-tailored two stage discrete choice probit model yet unknown in the literature. The results support the assumptions that novelty and inventive activity enhance a patent’s value. They confirm the importance of backward citations, family size, and forward citations as va lue indicators. However, they expand on and partly break with the respective explanations why patent indicators correlate with profitability. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6807 Filer i denne post: 1
wplefic012003.pdf (181.5Kb) -
Lando, Henrik (København, 2002)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
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A comparative analysis of the explanatory power of accounting and patent information for the market values of German firmsRamb, Fred; Reitzig, Markus (København, 2004)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: We present a theoretical and empirical analysis of the fitness of national German (German Commercial Code – Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB)) and international (IAS and US-GAAP) accounting information, as well as European patent data to explain the market values of German manufacturing firms. For the chosen volatile period from 1997 to 2002, cautious national accounting information does not correlate with the firms’ residual market values (RMV). International accounting information makes no meaningful contribution to explaining firms’ RMV and seems to measure overinvestment only. Finally, patents counted at the individual country level correlate with the firms’ RMV. Keywords: Accounting standards, investor information, market value, patents JEL-classifications: D82, M40, M41, K11 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6814 Filer i denne post: 1
wplefic072004.pdf (390.9Kb) -
A Comparative International Analysis of Innovation Incentives from Patent Indemnification RulesReitzig, Markus; Henkel, Joachim; Heath, Christopher (København, 2002)[Flere oplysninger][Færre oplysninger]
Resume: Abstract: This paper contributes to the fundamental discussion of setting optimal liabilities in restitution law by analyzing the effects that the existing multitude of indemnification rules for patent infringements have on innovative and imitative activity. From a theoretical legal standpoint, the choice of patent law is particularly enlightening due to its hybrid public and private nature. From an economic perspective its relevance lies in regulating the driving forces of welfare in highly industrialized societies. Our analysis of regulations from six different jurisdictions (US, JP, DE, UK, FR, NL) reveals that from a scholarly standpoint none of the regulations sets optimal liabilities in general. Our major finding is that an expectation damage rule based on a renegotiation outcome from an ex-ante perspective (falling in between the generic legal notions of ‘lost profits’ and ‘infringer’s profits’) between licensor and licensee appears optimal in patent infringement cases to avoid dynamic inefficiencies. The result is intuitive, however, was not predicted by the existing literature on indemnification law. Keywords: Patents, litigation, damage awards, innovation, infringement JEL-Classifications: K41,L00, L20 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6827 Filer i denne post: 1
wplefic182002new.pdf (499.7Kb)
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