Browsing Center for Law, Economics & Financial Institutions (LEFIC) by Title
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Lando, Henrik; Shavell, Steven (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Lando, Henrik (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: It is natural to suppose that delegation and incentives are complementary both in the sense that when more decisions are delegated to a lower level of an organizational hierarchy, more use should be made of incentives at that level, and in the sense that more use of incentives should be accompanied by more delegation. This issue is analyzed within a Principal-Agent framework in which there are two decisions to be made: an effort decision which can only be made by the Agent, and some other decision which can be made by either the Principal (i.e. be centralized) or by the Agent (i.e. be delegated). Within this framework it is shown that delegation and incentives are not necessarily complementary instruments; some decisions should be centralized when incentives are introduced. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6813 Files in this item: 1
lefic 2004-02.pdf (234.2Kb) -
Wihlborg, Clas; Angkinand, Apanard (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Predetermined, operational procedures for dealing with banks in distress are conspicuously absent across the world with very few exceptions. Instead governments and regulatory authorities intervene when banks approach failure. Bail-outs of important creditors, sometimes including shareholders, and blanket guarantees for creditors become the norm. We argue that efficient incentives of banks’ creditors, as well as of shareholders and managers, require predetermined rules for dealing with banks in distress, and a group of creditors that are credibly non-insured. Cross-border banking increases the need for pre-determined bank insolvency procedures that could enable banks to expand cross-border in branches. In the empirical part we show that credibility of non-insurance is maximized with a partial deposit insurance scheme, and that the coverage can be decreased if effective rule-based distress resolution procedures are implemented. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6773 Files in this item: 1
wplefic082005.pdf (249.8Kb) -
Angkinand, Apanard; Wihlborg, Clas (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Market discipline in banking requires that explicit and implicit insurance schemes for financial sector firms are limited, and that the lack of insurance of important stakeholders is credible. This credibility cannot be achieved without transparent, predictable procedures for distress resolution for banks, including explicit rules for the liquidation of insolvent banks. We find that very few European countries have explicit procedures for dealing with problem banks. The propositions tested in this paper are that the credibility of non-insurance in European banking depends strongly on (i) the degree of coverage of deposit insurance schemes, and (2) on the existence of enforceable rules that enhance the credibility of non-insurance of groups of stakeholders.in bank. The proxy used for credibility of non-insurance in Europe is the probability of banking crisis. Finding a U-shaped relation between the probabiity of banking crisis and the coverage of explicit deposit insurance we derive the degree of coverage that minimizes the probability of crisis in Western and Eastern Europe. JEL Classification: G21; G28; F43 Keywords: Deposit Insurance; Banking Crisis; Insolvency Procedures, Market Discipline URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6798 Files in this item: 1
wplefic062005.pdf (278.1Kb) -
Kowalski, Tadeusz; Kraft, Evan; Mullineux, Andrew; Vensel, Vello; Wihlborg, Clas (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
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Dietrich, J. Kimball; Wihlborg, Clas (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We investigate the effect of changes in capital regulation on the strictness (leniency) of loan terms using a simple model of bank capital requirements and asset quality examinations. Banks offer different levels of "leniency" in the sense of willingness to offer automatic extensions of loans in the presence of temporary payment difficulties of borrowers. Banks offering lenient (less strict) loan terms must have higher initial levels of capital and charge higher loan rates. When capital requirements are increased, both strict and lenient banks hold higher levels of initial capital and they raise loan rates. As capital requirements increase the difference between initial capital levels and between interest rates of strict and lenient banks decrease. Thus, higher capital requirements in recessions tend to reduce the interest rate premium paid for leniency. If a recession is interpreted as an increase in the required return, the interest rate premium paid for leniency is increased in recession at a given level of required capital. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6804 Files in this item: 1
wplefic082003.pdf (364.4Kb) -
Møllgaard, Peter (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Abstract: Price correlations are used to delineate the geographic market in two recent Danish electricity cases. They indicate that power generators hold temporally transitory and irregularly intermittent dominant positions. Calculation of the Lerner index reveals that they abused this position. The Danish Competition Authority decided to settle this case by agreement for reasons explained. We finally indicate how economics may be used pro-actively to achieve a better market design. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6801 Files in this item: 1
wplefic022003.pdf (404.6Kb) -
Cumming, Douglas J. (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Contracts and exits from a sample of 179 investment rounds in 132 entrepreneurial firms by 17 European venture capital (VC) funds are analyzed. The data indicate the financial contracts are quite heterogeneous in terms of both the cash flow and control rights. The use of different securities by European VC funds does not depend on the definition of venture capital, and the securities used are not functional equivalents. A normative empirical analysis of exit shows the likelihood of different types of exit vehicles (IPO, acquisition, and liquidation) and the returns to venture capital depend on not only firm specific characteristics but also the allocation of cash flow and control rights. Keywords: Venture Capital, Financial Contracting, Exit, IPO, Acquisition JEL Classification: G24, G28, G31, G32, G35 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6825 Files in this item: 1
wplefic142002.pdf (672.0Kb) -
Limits on Economic Harmonization in The United States and The European UnionSweeney, Richard J. (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The U.S. Constitution importantly limits the degree to which the federal government can impose harmonization across member states. This paper reviews these limitations and how they have evolved substantially over time in the U.S. It also discusses some of the benefits and costs of such limitations, and argues that the EU may benefit from adopting similar limitations. Harmonization of EU tax codes is likely to be economically harmful. On theoretical grounds, tax rates are likely to be harmonized at a common rate that is higher than optimal for the EU. This suggests the benefits of constitutional provisions that make tax harmonization difficult to impose. Other types of harmonization have a less clear-cut costbenefit analysis. A federal commercial code that is uniform across member states reduces transaction and information costs, compared to leaving important code issues to member states; further, many states may keep codes for long periods that are sub-optimal compared to a given federal code. A federal code may, however, fit poorly with other institutions of member states, potentially causing large costs. Leaving codes to the states leads to competition across states, and may generate forces for change for the better. Competition also generates information about the effectiveness and costs of different commercial codes. Because any country’s initial code is likely to be sub-optimal, and is likely to become less optimal over time, information on how to improve codes is valuable. Likely it is easier to learn and adapt from member states than from other countries. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6806 Files in this item: 1
wplefic112003.pdf (374.9Kb) -
Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Wihlborg, Clas; Angkinand, Apanard (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The ambiguity in existing empirical work with respect to effects of deposit insurance schemes on banks’ risk-taking can be resolved if it is recognized that absence of deposit insurance is rarely credible and that the credibility of non-insurance can be enhanced by explicit deposit insurance schemes. We show that under reasonable conditions for effects on risk-taking of creditor protection in banking, and for effects on credibility of non-insurance of explicit coverage of deposit insurance schemes, there exists a partial level of coverage that maximizes market discipline and minimizes moral hazard incentives for risk-taking in banking. Using both the occurrence of banking crises and non-performing loans in the banking sector as proxies for excessive risk-taking the results strongly support this hypothesis in industrial and emerging market economies. Policy recommendations on the country level require analyses of institutional factors affecting the credibility of non-insurance. In particular, the implementation of effective distress resolution procedures for banks would allow governments to reduce explicit deposit insurance coverage and, thereby, to strengthen market discipline. JEL Classification: G21; G28; F43 Keywords: Deposit Insurance; Banking Crisis; Insolvency Procedures, Market Discipline URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6808 Files in this item: 1
wplefic102005.pdf (642.4Kb) -
The case of biotechnology and pharmaceuticalsHarhoff, Dietmar; Reitzig, Markus (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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A Law and Economics Perspective on Optimal ContractingLando, Henrik (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
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Vensel, Vello (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In the 1990s, most of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) went through radical liberalization and adopted large-scale economic and political reform programs. These programs included almost complete price, trade and capital movement liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization, currency reform, and small-scale and large-scale privatization. What is the role of the development of a legal and institutional infrastructure along with these radical changes in society and the economy? The first part of this paper is based on the results of an interview study of entrepreneurs and managers in Estonia undertaken in 1998 and in Estonia, Russia, Finland and Sweden in 2000 in order to obtain their view of the behavior of government agencies, lawmaking procedures and the operation of law enforcement mechanisms. The second part of this paper presents summary results from interview surveys of Estonian manufacturing firms undertaken from 1994-2000. The surveys were designed to quantitatively measure the state of and changes in the Estonian business environment, focusing on the key aspects of financial contractual relationships of Estonian manufacturing firms as well as regulation and dispute resolution mechanisms. Among the observations it is noted that government regulations do not seriously affect business decisions regarding the operation, expansion or closing down of Estonian manufacturing firms. A second observation is that the Estonian court system is perceived as inadequate for resolving a substantial number of disputes and conflicts among economic agents although legislation exists. Most firms rely on mechanisms of self-enforcement when possible. Journal of Economic Literature Classification numbers: K42, K49, G18, G30 Keywords: business environment, corporate financial relationships, enterprise restructuring, corruption, law making procedures, law enforcement. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6790 Files in this item: 1
wplefic042004.pdf (248.8Kb) -
Lando, Henrik (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Does wrongful conviction lower deterrence and can this explain society’s aversion to sanctioning the innocent? This paper argues that for some of the most important categories of crime such as murder, assault or robbery, the answer to both questions is no. For these categories of crime, a potential offender need not fear wrongful conviction for any particular criminal act he or she chooses not to commit. For example, if a potential offender decides not to murder another person, he or she should not fear being wrongfully convicted of it, since the person will not be dead, and there will therefore be no investigation and no trial. He of she may risk being wrongfully convicted of another crime, but that risk exists independently of his or her own actions. It may be argued that wrongful conviction lowers deterrence in more indirect ways. First, the possibility of being sanctioned for a crime one does not commit may lower the threat of being sanctioned for a crime one commits, if two sanctions are not twice as threatening as one. Second, if wrongful conviction halts further investigations that may lead to the true offender, and third, if a potential offender thinks that if he or she does not take advantage of a crime opportunity, he or she may be wrongly convicted in the event that some other person grasps the same opportunity. However, it will be argued that wrongful conviction may also increase deterrence, and the three indirect effects are in any event unlikely to be quantitatively important in the real world. An implication of the present analysis is that society’s aversion to sanctioning the innocent cannot be rationalized by or reduced to a concern for deterrence. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6803 Files in this item: 1
wplefic092004rev2.pdf (163.7Kb) -
Riis, Thomas (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Evidence from Market and Accounting DataGoldberg, Lawrence G.; Sweeney, Richard J.; Wihlborg, Clas G. (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper discusses results and difficulties of comparing banks' performance based on publicly available data for the case of Nordea, a pan-Nordic bank created through mergers of important national banks. The objective of the performance comparison is to determine whether Nordea's unique strategy of functional intergation across four countries can be advantageous. For stock-market data, however, Nordea does not have stable betas on risk factors, as illustrated by market betas, and thus the comparables method must be used with great care. The Nordea holding company performed about as well as the comparables, both in terms of stock-market and accounting data. Nordea banks in individual countries outperformed comparable holding companies; by arithmetic, Nordea non-bank operations are not as profitable as its bank operations. In event studies, the market views Nordea's acquisitions as adding value. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6812 Files in this item: 1
wplefic052005.pdf (339.2Kb) -
Some Lessons from United States Constitutional HistorySweeney, Richard J. (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: A constitution is more likely to be accepted if it federalizes those issues that are widely seen as needing complete harmonization. A constitution is more likely to endure if the federal government does not have powers that are not vital to it but which may alienate some member states to the point that the federal government loses legitimacy. It appears vital to have trade policy at the European Union level; for euro countries, monetary policy is already federalized. It is not clear that common foreign and defense policies are needed; insisting on common foreign and defense policies may lead to conflicts within and across member states that severely weaken the Union, conceivably contributing to eventual collapse. Insisting on harmonization of commercial codes does not have the destructive potential of attempting completely to harmonize defense and foreign policies; it may, however, lead to needless conflict that helps drain the reservoir of goodwill that the European Union will need for dealing with other conflicts amongst member states. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6787 Files in this item: 1
wplefic092003.pdf (442.7Kb) -
Lessons from the UKMallin, Chris; Mullineux, Andy; Wihlborg, Clas (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In 1992 the Cadbury Committee report on the financial aspects of corporate governance was published. The Committee had been established following the failures of a number of high profile businesses in the UK which had shaken confidence in the market. Some nine years later, in 2001, the collapse of Enron sent shockwaves through the US market. As a result of the Enron collapse and various other high profile scandals in the years since its occurrence, the US is examining its own corporate governance structures and provisions to determine how these might be improved and help avoid another Enron. The EU similarly is developing principles and legislation to improve corporate governance, and scandals such as Royal Ahold and Parmalat have helped drive further governance reforms. In this paper we detail the development of corporate governance codes in the UK and the adaptation of similar codes in the EU. We discuss the role of the financial sector in corporate governance and how principles for regulation and supervision of the financial sector complement codes of conduct and legislation in the area of corporate governance. JEL Classification numbers: G34, G28, G22, G23 Keywords: corporate governance, financial sector; institutional investors. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6789 Files in this item: 1
wplefic062004.pdf (171.8Kb) -
Wihlborg, Clas (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
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