Browsing Center of Market Economics (CME) by Title
Previous Page
Now showing items 12-14 of 14
-
[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The concept and phenomenon of trust and its relation to leadership has recently come into focus. What role does trust play? Can trust be created strategically? Questions like these are often raised. How we conceive of and conceptualize trust is not as often discussed. Among those conceptualizations of trust available are those understanding trust as normatively value laden and those attempting to understand trust as normatively neutral. In this article I will attempt to challenge the idea that trust as a concept and phenomenon meaningfully can be understood as symmetrical and normatively neutral. One need not continue the phrase "trust is good," with "control is better," as e.g., Stalin did. Let us stop with "trust is good," and look at the implications of this evaluation. It is my conviction that trust is normally something which is normatively desirable, and that trust is a concept which cannot be exempted from a discussion of value judgment. This is perhaps because trust as a phenomenon is good in itself, even before it becomes good for something else. This point of view has consequences for understanding trust as connected to a systematic form of observation which is more or less directly claimed to be normatively neutral.i Such a view on analyzing trust presupposes that trust and mistrust are symmetrical and not so different. Such a point of view makes it possible for the terminology to maintain its normative neutrality (Luhmann 1979). Understanding trust by defining it as a conception characterized by normative neutrality is in thesystem theoretical universe interconnected with the fundamental premise that functionality and functional self-stabilization are more important than validity.The assumption of neutrality is also interconnected with the idea that functionality is normatively neutral and is not in itself attributed value judgments. Mistrust becomes, in principle, as equally good a form of observation as trust – or more explicitly stated, the question of good becomes irrelevant in the systems theoretical universe – all that is relevant is that both observations claim to be able to reduce complexity. It is this viewpoint on value related neutrality and concept related symmetry I wish to subject to a critical evaluation. At the same time I am interested in showing that one can in fact say something about trust and trust production by exposing some of the conditions which lay at the foundation for declaring trust or mistrust. My argument against the understanding of trust as value neutral is divided into five sections wherein I address different aspects of trust as a concept and phenomenon. In the first section, I address the trust concept’s connection with other related concepts, and show the inherent attribution of value within the concept. In the following section, I show the complexity which arises in and with that trust both can be a precondition for and a product of social processes. The creation of trust can be both the intentionally intended and functionally unintended; for example, trust can be something that is desirable, but can arise without anyone having planned it. In the third section, I argue that there is a difference between having trust in a phenomenon and having trust in one’s knowledge of the same phenomenon. The fourth section addresses the question in relation to the trust phenomena’s strategic flexibility of form for example, the idea that one with leadership tools can consciously bring forth trust. In the conclusion, the question about trust communication is addressed. In this section I argue that trust is positively value-laden, becausesincerity is a functional and pragmatic condition for successful communication which is oriented towards understanding. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7671 Files in this item: 1
wp 06 - trust and leadership.pdf (108.1Kb) -
Bordum, Anders (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In this articlei I will argue that trust is a fundamental and critical concept because trust is the direct or transcendental constitutive ground of most social phenomena, as well as applicable as an operational method in critical theory. There are two different but overlapping positions on trust I address in this article. One is the standpoint we find in business strategy, that trust is naïve to show, and control or contracts are presumed better. In the strategy game the idealistic good guys seems to lose (Arrow 1974), (Williamson 1975). The other position is the position taken by systems theory where trust is treated as if it was a value-neutral system-internal decision, which presupposes that trust and mistrust are symmetrically interrelated functionally (Luhmann 1979). In his early book Trust and Power, Niklas Luhmann seems to agree with the vision guiding my general argument that there is a need for clear directions and specifications in organisations and systems as to whether trust or distrust is appropriate and rational (Luhmann 1979:93). Yet I challenge these positions described above with an alternative understanding inspired by Jürgen Habermas which can be applied as an operational strategy for analyzing trust in its’ empirical and social distribution, without ignoring the questions of validity in real social settings where trust is actively playing a direct or indirect constitutional role in the foundation of most interactions, organisations, institutions, and societies. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7675 Files in this item: 1
wp2004-004.pdf (106.5Kb) -
Bordum, Anders (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Jeg vil i denne sammenhæng præsentere en fortolkning af hvordan Jürgen Habermas i forhold til klassisk epistemologi forstår viden og læring. Jeg vil argumentere for at vi i videnssamfundet har brug for den realistiske diskursbaserede model for videnstestning og vidensdannelse Habermas repræsenterer. Endvidere vil jeg ved at rekonstruere Habermas’ position med overbevisningen og propositionen som omdrejningspunkt vise at Habermas teori direkte kan omsættes som analysegrundlag og forståelsesramme for en hvilken som helst tematiseret praksis. Alt hvad der er virkeligt kan udtrykkes propositionelt. Den kritiske teoris metode handler grundlæggende om at finde en interessant proposition og herefter finde argumenter for og imod dens gyldighed. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7673 Files in this item: 1
wp 08 - viden og laering.pdf (207.1Kb)
Previous Page
Now showing items 12-14 of 14