Browsing Research documents by Author "Jones, Derek C."
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Theory and Evidence from the BalticsJones, Derek C.; Mygind, Niels (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We begin by identifying a typical governance life-cycle, defined as changes in ownership structure, and including both the identity of the major owner and ownership concentration. The cycle is marked by key events and phases including start-up, initial growth, mature growth, and possibly a crisis and restructuring stage or exit stage. The governance cycle for transitional countries reflects some specific characteristics –e.g. often privatization produces specific initial ownership structures, with an unusually high proportion of insider, especially, employee ownership. Subsequently pres-sures for restructuring produce strong impulses for ownership changes. There is limited possibility for external finance because of the embryonic development of the banking system and the capital markets during early transition. The governance cycle is also influenced by specific features of the institutional, cultural and economic environment in a country. The varying importance of these fac-tors is expected to produce differences in key features of ownership cycles such as the speed at which particular ownership changes occur. To provide simple hypothesis tests, we use new and rich enterprise panel data sets for the three Bal-tic countries. The data enable various measures of ownership to be constructed (including the iden-tity of major owners and ownership concentration). The empirical analysis covers the ownership cycle with emphasis on initial ownership and subsequent changes. Our key method is to assemble a series of transition matrices showing both starting and final ownership configurations for sample enterprises and to simultaneously provide information on changes in concentration for the largest single owner. For Estonia this is supplemented with an analysis of the frequencies of different own-ership-cycles including intermediary stages of ownership. In spite of important differences in insti-tutional development, especially concerning the privatization process, we find that governance cy-cles are broadly similar in all countries. Employee ownership is rapidly fading and mainly being succeeded by managerial ownership. There are changes back and forth between manager and do-mestic external ownership, while foreign ownership is quite stable. Ownership concentration is mostly increasing after privatization, which included diversification both to employees and external owners. Since ownership diversification did not sit well with the slow development of the institu-tional framework, as expected we see a subsequent concentration of ownership on both managers, external domestic and foreign owners. However, variation in institutions, there are also important differences across countries. The adjustment of ownership structures is faster in Estonia and this can be explained by the relatively fast pace of institutional change and evolution of important gov-ernance institutions, including tough bankruptcy legislation and advances in the financial system. JEL-codes: G3, J5, P2, P3 Keywords: corporate governance, life-cycle, privatization, ownership change, transition econo-mies, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania . URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6611 Files in this item: 1
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Evidence using stochastic frontier approachSinani, Evis; Jones, Derek C.; Mygind, Niels (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
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evidence from the BalticsJones, Derek C.; Mygind, Niels (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
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Hobdari, Bersant; Jones, Derek C.; Mygind, Niels (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Unlike previous empirical work in analyzing investment behavior and the determinants of liquidity constraints, we use a switching regression framework when sample separation is unknown and endogenous and firms are assumed to operate either in the financially constrained or in the financially unconstrained regime. The actual regime the firm is in is determined by a switching or selection function, which depends on those variables that theoretically determine the wedge between internal and external finance, the severity of information and agency problems and time-varying firm characteristics. By using new panel data for Estonian companies during 1993 through 1999 we find that: (i) separate regimes exist in investment behavior; (ii) the likelihood of being financially constrained is higher in firms that are recently privatized, small and where ownership is concentrated in the hands of insiders and the state; (iii) soft budget constraints lower the probability of a firm being financially constrained; (iv) the actual probabilities of operating in the financially constrained regime are calculated to be quite high and essentially stable during 1993-1999: 0.52-0.57 for state owned firms, 0.40-0.46 for domestic owned firms and 0.53-0.57 for employee owned firms; (v) ownership structure affects investment beyond its indirect effects through financial constraints. Corporate Investment, Liquidity Constraints, Insider Ownership, Switching Regression, Soft Budget Constraint. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6626 Files in this item: 1
switchingregressionpaper-1.pdf (418.7Kb) -
evidence from EstoniaJones, Derek C.; Mygind, Niels (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
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evidence from EstoniaJones, Derek C.; Mygind, Niels (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
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evidence from EstoniaJones, Derek C.; Mygind, Niels (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
Now showing items 1-7 of 7