Browsing Research documents by Author "Keuschnigg, Christian"
Now showing items 1-6 of 6
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Keuschnigg, Christian; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper proposes and analyses a model of start-up investment. Innovative entrepreneurs are commercially inexperienced and can benefit from venture capital support. Only part of them succeed in matching with a venture capitalist while the rest must resort to standard bank finance. We consider a number of policies to promote entrepreneurship and venture capital backed innovation. JEL Classification: D82, G24, G28, H24. Keywords: venture capital bank finance, matching, moral hazard, public policy. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7658 Files in this item: 1
cesifo working paper no. 850.pdf (392.7Kb) -
Keuschnigg, Christian; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2001)[More information][Less information]
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Keuschnigg, Christian; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In recent years, venture capital has become an important source for nancing young entrepreneurial rms. Given the apparently more innovative nature and extra value added of venture capital backed rms compared to other firms, policy makers have taken an increasing interest in an active venture capital industry. We explore how selected policy instruments determine the incentives of individuals to start up new rms and of venture capitalists to nance and advise them, and how policy thereby influences the size and nature of the industry and how it aspects aggregate welfare. We examine the impact of wage and corporate income taxes as well as capital gains taxes and start-up capital subsidies on the volume and quality of venture capital backed entrepreneurship. JEL-Classi cation: D82, G24, H24, H25 Keywords: Entrepreneurship, venture capital, double moral hazard, taxes, sub-sidies. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7569 Files in this item: 1
wp15-06.pdf (291.5Kb) -
Keuschnigg, Christian; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In financing start-up firms, venture capitalists carefully select among alternative projects, design incentive compatible financial contracts and support portfolio companies with value enhancing managerial advice. This paper considers how venture capitalists can induce self-selection among entrepreneurial firms with different qualities by designing appropriate contracts and offering commercial support. We study the efficiency of the competitive market equilibrium with respect to the level and quality of entrepreneurship and the level of effort by entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. We also provide comparative statics results with respect to basic preference and technology parameters. Venture capital, entrepreneurship, self-selection, moral hazard. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7707 Files in this item: 1
artikel 07.pdf (407.6Kb) -
Keuschnigg, Christian; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In recent years, venture capital has increasingly become a factor in the financing of new firms. We examine how the value of mature firms determines the incentives of entrepreneurs to start up new firms and of venture capitalists to finance and advise them. We examine how capital gains taxes as well as subsidies to start-up costs of new firms affect venture capital-backed entrepreneurship. We also argue that dividend and capital gains taxes on mature firms have important consequences for start-up firms as well. JEL Classification: D82, G24, H24 and H25 Keywords: double moral hazard, entrepreneurship, taxes and venture capital URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7592 Files in this item: 1
cepr nr. 4097.pdf (464.2Kb) -
Keuschnigg, Christian; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In this paper we set up a model of start-up finance under double moral hazard. Entrepreneurs lack own resources and business experience to develop their ideas. Venture capitalists can provide start-up finance and commercial support. The effort put forth by either agent contributes to the firm’s success, but is not verifiable. As a result, the market equilibrium is biased towards inefficiently low venture capital support. The capital gains tax becomes especially harmful, as it further impairs advice and causes a first-order welfare loss. Once the capital gains tax is in place, limitations on loss off-set may paradoxically contribute to higher quality of venture capital finance and welfare. Subsidies to physical investment in VC-backed startups are detrimental in our framework. Keywords: Venture capital, capital gains taxation, double moral hazard. JEL-Classification: D82, G24, H24, H25 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6821 Files in this item: 1
wplefic032003.pdf (694.8Kb)
Now showing items 1-6 of 6