Browsing Research documents by Author "Larsen, Birthe"
Now showing items 1-19 of 19
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Larsen, Birthe; Waisman, Gisela (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We exploit the regional variation in negative attitudes towards immigrants to Sweden in order to analyse what are the consequences of such attitudes have on immigrants welfare. A well educated immigrant from a non developed country who lives in a municipality with strong negative attitudes earns less than what she would earn if she lived in a municipality where natives are more positive. If attitudes changed from the average level to the most positive level, her wage would increase by 12%. This would reduce the wage gap to well-educated immigrants from developed countries by 70%. We interpret this eect as evidence of labour market discrimination. The same reduction in negative attitudes would increase the welfare of immigrants from Africa and Asia, through their wage and local amenities, by an equivalent to one third of their wage. The analogous amount for immigrants from South America and Eastern Europe is one fourth of their wage if they are well educated and one tenth otherwise. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7587 Files in this item: 1
wp11-2007.pdf (1.182Mb) -
Filges, Trine; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2000)[More information][Less information]
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Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: While examining the macroeconomic effects of government tax and punishment policies, this paper develops a three-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargaining. Workers are assumed to differ in ability, and the choice of education is determined endogenously. Job opportunities in an informal sector are available only to workers who choose not to acquire higher education. We find that increased punishment of informal activities increases the number of educated workers and reduces the number of unemployed workers. Considering welfare, we show it is optimal to choose punishment rates so to more than fully counteract the distortion created by the government’s inability to tax the informal sector. JEL-codes: H26, I21, J64 Keywords: Tax evasion, underground economy, education, matching, unemployment. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7558 Files in this item: 1
wpec122003.pdf (356.0Kb) -
Filges, Trine; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2001)[More information][Less information]
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Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe (Frederiksberg, 2011)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper develops a four sector equilibrium search and matching model with informal sector employment opportunities and educational choice. We show that underground activities reduce educational at- tainments if informal employment opportunities mainly are available to low educated workers. More zealous enforcement policy will in this case improve educational incentives as it reduces the attractiveness of remaining a low educated worker. Characterizing the optimal enforce- ment policies, we nd that relatively more audits should be targeted towards the sector employing low educated workers, elsewise a too low stock of educated workers is materialized. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8328 Files in this item: 1
Kolm_Larsen_WP_2-2011.pdf (309.1Kb) -
Filges, Trine; Larsen, Birthe (Århus, 2000)[More information][Less information]
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Larsen, Birthe; Waisman, Gisela (Frederiksberg, 2012)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We examine the impact of discrimination on labour market performance when workers are subject to a risk of losing skills during the experience of unemployment. Within a search and matching model, we show that all natives and immigrants are affected by discrimination. Discrimination in one sector has positive spillovers, inducing employment increases in the other sector. Discrimination may induce immigrants to train more or less than natives, depending on the sector where it is present. Welfare tends to be most negatively affected by discrimination among highproductivity workers. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8520 Files in this item: 1
Larsen_Waisman_wp2012-5.pdf (374.6Kb) -
Filges, Trine; Kennes, John; Larsen, Birthe; Tranæs, Torben (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper studies labour market policy in a society where differently gifted individuals can invest in training to further increase their labour market productivity and where the government seeks both effiency and equity. Frictions in the matching process create unemployment and differently skilled workers face different unemployment risks. We show that in such an environment, training programmes that are targeted to the unemployed complement passive transfers (UI benefits), unlike a general training subsidy. Combining passive subsidies with a training subsidy conditioned on the individual being unemployed (for a while) - the typical Active Labour Market Programme - implies a favorable trade-off between equity and efficiency which encourages high spending on training. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7511 Files in this item: 1
wp 2005.11equity.pdf (230.2Kb) -
The Choice of Educational TypeAlstadsæter, Annette; Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper examines the effect of taxes on the individuals' choices of educational direction, and thus on the economy.s skill composition. A proportional labour tax induces too many workers with high innate ability to choose an educational type associated with high consumption value and low effort. This increases the skill mismatch and aggregate unemployment in the economy. The government can correct for this distortion by use of differentiated tuition fees or tax rates. JEL codes: J64, J68, H21, H24 Keywords: Unemployment, matching, education, optimal taxation, tuition fees URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7562 Files in this item: 1
wp23-2005.pdf (207.8Kb) -
Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2001)[More information][Less information]
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Larsen, Birthe (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper examines the implications of that workers may not be able to estimate their true costs of acquiring skills. Consequently, too few workers may acquire skills. This allows for the possibility that subsidizing education is welfare improving. Furthermore, if the presence of skill-biased technological shocks increase unemployment, this may explain why the market it-self cannot respond to this by making it sufficiently attractive to acquire skills. Consequently, the trade-off in-between subsidizing education and thereby reducing unemployment and optimizing welfare may be eliminated. We analyse this issue in a simple educational model and next in a search equilibrium model including a skill choice decision. Keywords: Education, subsidies, efficiency, unemployment. JEL codes: I20, J64. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7593 Files in this item: 1
wpec172004.pdf (269.2Kb) -
Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Kennes, John; Tranæs, Torben; Larsen, Birthe; Filges, Trine (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We find that the main featues of labor policy across OECD countries can be explained by a simple general equilibrium search model with risk neutral agents and a government that chooses policy to maximize a social welfare function. In equilibrum, policies are chosen to optimal redistribute income from advantaged to disadvantaged workers. A worker can be disadvantaged in the sense that they may have less ability to aquire and utilize skills in the workplace. The model explains why passive benefits tend to fall and active benefits tend to increase during the course of unemployment spell. The model also explains why countries that appear to pursue equity spend more on both active and passive labor market programs. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7648 Files in this item: 1
wp13-06.pdf (197.7Kb) -
Filges, Trine; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2001)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper examines the macroeconomic effects of youth unemployment programmes in the form of vocational training (YUPs), developing a two sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-fi rm wage bargaining for skilled workers. Unskilled sector wages are indexed to skilled sector wages. Workers differ with respect to ability, having importance for the young worker s skill decision. Furthermore, a young worker may be offered vocational training through YUPs. The total number of skilled workers is therefore determined by these two channels and the interaction between them. We focus on the impact of of YUPs on skill division, unemployment distribution workers and aggregate unemployment. Keywords: Skill acquisition, search, JEL classi cations: J18 J38 J68 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7601 Files in this item: 1
wpec092001.pdf (415.6Kb) -
Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe (Frederiksberg, 2010)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper develops a general equilibrium search and matching model where an underground economy co-exists along with the formal part of the economy. In analyzing how tax and punishment policies a¤ect labour market performance, we find that punishment of infor- mal sector activities induce workers and firms to reallocate towards the formal sector. However, more importantly, we find that this real- location tends to improve e¢ ciency in search, reduce the overall wage pressure, and reduce actual unemployment. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8209 Files in this item: 1
wp5-2010.pdf (158.2Kb) -
Waisman, Gisela; Larsen, Birthe (Frederiksberg, 2012)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We exploit the regional variation in negative attitudes towards immigrants to Sweden in order to analyse the consequences of the attitudes on immigrants welfare. We find that attitudes towards immigrants are of importance: they both affect their labour market outcomes and their quality of life. We interpret the negative effect on wages as evidence of labour market discrimination. We estimate the welfare effects of negative attitudes, through their wage and local amenities, for immigrants with different levels of skills, origin, gender and age. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8519 Files in this item: 1
Waisman_Larsen_wp2012-4.pdf (542.0Kb) -
Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: While examining the macroeconomic effects of increased government control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker- firm wage bargaining. Workers search for jobs in both the formal and the informal sector. We analyse the impact of higher punishment rates and a higher audit rate on labour market performance. We find that a higher punishment rate reduces the size of the informal sector and reduces unemployment. A higher audit rate has an ambiguous impact on unemployment, and may actually increase the size of the underground economy. JEL-codes: H26 Keywords: Tax evasion, underground economy, matching, bargaining, unemployment. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7487 Files in this item: 1
wpec112003.pdf (294.6Kb) -
Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2001)[More information][Less information]
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Waisman, Gisela; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The eects of discrimination of immigrants on the labour market are studied within a search and wage-bargaining setting including a risk of losing skills during the experience of unemployment. The negative eects of discrimination in the form of higher unemployment and lower wages spread to all workers, immigrants and natives, in all sectors of the economy. The eect is stronger for immigrants, but natives suer as well. An increase in the share of immigrants in the economy exacerbates the problem of discrimination. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7634 Files in this item: 1
wp12-2007.pdf (768.8Kb)
Now showing items 1-19 of 19