Browsing Research documents by Author "Thomsen, Steen"
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Pedersen, Torben; Thomsen, Steen (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
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Pedersen, Torben; Thomsen, Steen (København, 2001)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The causal relationship between insider ownership and market valuation is tested by simultaneous estimation of the causes and effect of insider ownership among the largest continental European companies. Controlling for nation and industry effects insider ownership (measured by the fraction of "closely held" shares) is found to have a positive effect on market valuation (market-to-book values). And market valuation is found to have a positive feedback effect on the level of insider ownership. The findings provide empirical support for a theoretical model proposed by La Porta et al (1999). But the results are also found to be sensitive to owner identity: while a higher level of financial and corporate insider ownership is found to increase market valuation, family ownership has no significant effect, and a higher level of government ownership is found to reduce market valuation. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6535 Files in this item: 1
linkwp01-13.pdf (92.70Kb) -
An alternative perspective on the convergence of corporate governance systemsThomsen, Steen (København, 2001)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The possible convergence of international systems of corporate governance has become the topic of a lively debate. In opposition to the political theory (Roe 1991, 1994), Gilson (2000) and Coffee (1999) have persuasively argued that although little formal convergence may be taking place in ownership and board structure, corporate behaviour seems to be converging in a functional sense. This paper reviews Coffees argument and some of the ensuing debate emphasising internationalisation of equity markets as the powerful driving force behind convergence. But while the debate has focused rather narrowly on convergence of European governance to American standards, I argue that US corporate governance has also converged to European standards: insider ownership and managerial incentives have increased; outside board members, independent subcommittees and chairmen have become more common and the banking system has been deregulated to allow banks to play a more active governance role. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6872 Files in this item: 1
linkwp01-1.pdf (42.15Kb) -
Comparing networks and formal institutionsSinani, Evis; Thomsen, Steen; Staffsud, Anna; Randoy, Trond; Edling, Christofer (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
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Vinten, Frederik; Thomsen, Steen (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We analyze delistings from European stock exchanges 1995-2005 as a function of market conditions, firm effects and governance regulation. We find that investor protection and corporate governance quality reduce the likelihood of going private, bankrupt or liquidated, but increase the likelihood of exit by merger or acquisition. Taking into consideration that corporate governance policy may be endogenously determined, the estimated policy effects turn out to be highly sensitive to model specification, but our best estimates produce qualitatively similar results. We conclude that the evidence is most consistent with efficient regulation: better protection of minority investors and higher corporate governance quality stimulates the market for corporate control (M&A) and reduces the incentive to go private. However, going private transactions have increased significantly while governance standards have been improved over the past decade, and we would not ignore the possibility that more regulation would lead to more delistings. For example, we find indications that the adoption of corporate governance codes and changes in the level of corporate governance indices increase the propensity to go private. It seems likely that increasing investor protection will at some point add more costs than benefits to companies and investors. Governments should therefore consider both costs and benefits of further regulation. Key words: Delisting, public listing, mergers, acquisitions, bankruptcy, liquidation, going private, private equity, investor protection. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7504 Files in this item: 1
wp12-06.pdf (330.3Kb) -
US and EU EvidencePedersen, Torben; Thomsen, Steen; Kvist, Hans Kurt (København, 2001)[More information][Less information]
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Pedersen, Torben; Thomsen, Steen; Kvist, Hans Kurt (København, 2001)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The causal relationship between insider ownership and market valuation is tested on a database of the largest EU and US companies. Using a Granger causality test insider ownership (measured by the fraction of closely held shares) is found to have a negative effect on market valuation (measured as the simple Tobin's Q ratio). And market valuation is found to have a negative effect on insider ownership. Consistent with an overall non-linear relationship as hypothesised by Morck et al. (1988) and Stultz (1988), the negative effect from insider ownership to performance is found to be significant only for companies with high initial levels of insider ownership, but insignificant for companies with low initial concentration levels. Furthermore, the effect on market valuation turns out to depend on system affiliation: it is only significant in continental Europe where average insider ownership is much higher than in the Anglo-American world (UK and US). URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6900 Files in this item: 1
linkwp01-18.pdf (66.70Kb) -
Thomsen, Steen; Kronborg, Dorte (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Does foreign ownership enhance or decrease a firm’s chances of survival? Over the 100 year period 1895-2001 this paper compares the survival of foreign subsidiaries in Denmark to a control sample matched by industry and firm size. We find that foreign-owned companies have higher survival probability. On average exit risk for domestic companies is 2.3 times higher than for foreign companies. First movers like Siemens, Philips, Kodak, Ford, GM or Goodyear have been active in the country for almost a century. Relative foreign survival increases with company age. However, the foreign survival advantage appears to be eroded by globalization, it decreases over time and disappears at the end of the century. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6624 Files in this item: 1
working paper int_steen thomsen.pdf (1.797Mb) -
do companies need owners?Thomsen, Steen; Rose, Caspar (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Foss, Nicolai Juul; Lando, Henrik; Thomsen, Steen (København, 1998)[More information][Less information]
Now showing items 1-10 of 10