Browsing Research documents by Subject "kreditrisiko"
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Kowalski, Tadeusz; Kraft, Evan; Mullineux, Andrew; Vensel, Vello; Wihlborg, Clas (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
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Dietrich, J. Kimball; Wihlborg, Clas (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We investigate the effect of changes in capital regulation on the strictness (leniency) of loan terms using a simple model of bank capital requirements and asset quality examinations. Banks offer different levels of "leniency" in the sense of willingness to offer automatic extensions of loans in the presence of temporary payment difficulties of borrowers. Banks offering lenient (less strict) loan terms must have higher initial levels of capital and charge higher loan rates. When capital requirements are increased, both strict and lenient banks hold higher levels of initial capital and they raise loan rates. As capital requirements increase the difference between initial capital levels and between interest rates of strict and lenient banks decrease. Thus, higher capital requirements in recessions tend to reduce the interest rate premium paid for leniency. If a recession is interpreted as an increase in the required return, the interest rate premium paid for leniency is increased in recession at a given level of required capital. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6804 Files in this item: 1
wplefic082003.pdf (364.4Kb) -
Florentsen, Bjarne; Møller, Michael; Nielsen, Niels Chr. (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
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Florentsen, Bjarne; Møller, Michael; Nielsen, Niels Christian (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In many OECD countries, a seller has a right to reimbursement of VAT (RVAT) she has paid on goods sold, but for which she has not yet received payment. Such reimbursement of VAT on receivables is economically inefficient. It leads to: * Distortion of credit markets, by subsidizing direct credit at the cost of financial intermediaries. * Price discrimination, by subsidizing buyers with low creditworthiness. * A less efficient collection of bad debts, as trade with bad debts is made extremely expensive. The finance literature presents several "good" arguments in favor of trade credits, e.g. transaction costs and asymmetric information. In contrast RVAT is an economically "bad" argument for trade credit. It is a subsidy that leads to inefficiently high use of trade credit. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7193 Files in this item: 1
reimbursement_of_vat_2003-1.pdf (373.0Kb)
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