Opportunities for computer abuse

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Opportunities for computer abuse

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dc.contributor.author Willison, Robert en_US
dc.contributor.author Backhouse, James en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:23:45Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:23:45Z
dc.date.issued 2005-09-22T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6453
dc.description.abstract Systems risk refers to the likelihood that an IS is inadequately guarded against certain types of damage or loss. While risks are posed by acts of God, hackers and viruses, consideration should also be given to the ‘insider’ threat of dishonest employees, intent on undertaking some form of computer abuse. Against this backdrop, a number of researchers have addressed the extent to which security managers are cognizant of the very nature of systems risk. In particular, they note how security practitioners’ knowledge of local threats, which form part of such risk, is often fragmented. This contributes to situations where risk reducing efforts are often less than effective. Security efforts are further complicated given that the task of managing systems risk requires input from a number of departments including, for example, HR, compliance, IS/IT and physical security. In a bid to complement existing research, but also offer a fresh perspective, this paper addresses systems risk from the offender’s perspective. If systems risk entails the likelihood that an IS is inadequately protected, this text considers those conditions, within the organisational context, which offer a criminal opportunity for the offender. To achieve this goal a model known as the ‘Crime Specific Opportunity Structure’ is advanced. Focussing on the opportunities for computer abuse, the model addresses the nature of such opportunities with regards to the organisational context and the threats posed by rogue employees. Drawing on a number of criminological theories, it is believed the model may help inform managers about local threats and, by so doing, enhance safeguard implementation. en_US
dc.format.extent 45 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2005-010 en_US
dc.subject.other edb-sikkerhed en_US
dc.subject.other edb-kriminalitet en_US
dc.subject.other virksomhedens sikkerhed en_US
dc.subject.other medarbejderkriminalitet en_US
dc.subject.other crime specific opportunity structure en_US
dc.title Opportunities for computer abuse en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt05sep22 miel en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Informatik en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort INF en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Informatics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort INF en_US
dc.idnumber x656503601 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2005 en_US
dc.title.subtitle Considering systems risk from the offender’s perspective en_US


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