Market Response to Inefficient Judiciary

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Market Response to Inefficient Judiciary

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dc.contributor.author Gregoric, Aleksandra en_US
dc.contributor.author Zajc, Katarina en_US
dc.contributor.author Simoneti, Marko en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:23:57Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:23:57Z
dc.date.issued 2007-12-11T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6531
dc.description.abstract The paper re-examines the concerns on the rule-based governance in poor institutional environment. By relying on the theories and research vehicles of social psychology, we show that under certain conditions, the ‘law on books’ may still play role in governing market transactions, even though no formal enforcement applies. We furthermore expose the potential of the Corporate Governance Code as the ‘signaling device’ and provide arguments as to why this potential may be even stronger in an environment with relatively weak institutions in comparison to the developed market economies. en_US
dc.format.extent 30 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2007-9 en_US
dc.title Market Response to Inefficient Judiciary en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt07dec11 nijemo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for International Økonomi og Virksomhedsledelse en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort INT en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of International Economics and Management en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort IEM en_US
dc.idnumber x656555954 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2007 en_US
dc.title.subtitle Promoting Rule Compliance and Good Governance Practice en_US


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