The European Parliament's Rejection of the Take-over Directive Proposal


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The European Parliament's Rejection of the Take-over Directive Proposal

Vis færre oplysninger Knudsen, Jette Steen en_US 2009-02-04T10:24:06Z 2009-02-04T10:24:06Z 2004-01-21T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.description.abstract This article examines why Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in 2001 turned down a proposal for an EU take-over directive? The first explanation focuses on party ideology. However, MEPs overwhelmingly voted according to national rather than party lines. Two additional explanations emphasise national characteristics: labour market legislation (national schemes to protect employees against dismissals) and corporate governance issues. Labour market legislation can explain the UK and German MEP votes but not the Swedish and French MEPs votes. These votes can be explained by emphasising measures against take-overs such as a high level of market capitalisation and unequal voting rights. en_US
dc.format.extent 35 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2003 en_US
dc.subject.other virksomhedsovertagelser en_US
dc.subject.other eu en_US
dc.subject.other fusioner en_US
dc.subject.other eu-direktiver en_US
dc.subject.other europa-parlamentet en_US
dc.title The European Parliament's Rejection of the Take-over Directive Proposal en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt04jan21 mielmo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for International Økonomi og Virksomhedsledelse en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort INT en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of International Economics and Management en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort INT
dc.idnumber x656378637 en_US København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2003 en_US
dc.title.subtitle A Corporate Governance Approach en_US

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