Working Papers (AA/ACC)
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Rohde, Carsten; Rossing, Christian Plesner (Frederiksberg, 2011)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: When an enterprise is divided into smaller organizational units, each with its own results accountability, the question arises how to manage and measure the efficiency and profitability of such units. A task which is complicated when organizational units in the same enterprise or enterprise group trade internally as the units have to decide what prices should be paid for such inter-unit transfers. One important challenge is to uncover the consequences that different transfer prices have on the willingness in the organizational units to coordinate activities and trade internally. At the same time the determination of transfer price will affect the size of the profit or loss in the organizational units and thus have an impact on the evaluation of managers‟ performance. In some instances the determination of transfer prices may lead to a disagreement between coordination of the organizational units and overall profitability of the enterprise on the one hand and measurement of profitability and managers‟ performance in the units on the other. This chapter addresses these issues. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8374 Files in this item: 1
Carsten_Rohde_Transfer_Pricing.pdf (1.661Mb) -
Rohde, Carsten (Frederiksberg, 2011)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Budgets and budget control has been known since the early 19th century1. However the use of budget control was until the beginning of the 1920ies in US primarily related to governmental units and states and to a minor extent to business units in practice. At that time James McKinsey describes budgetary control as involving the following2: 1. The statement of the plans of all the departments of the business for a certain period of time in the form of estimates 2. The coordination of these estimates into a well-balanced program for the business as a whole. 3. The preparation of reports showing a comparison between the actual and the estimated performance, and the revision of the original plans when these reports show that such a revision is necessary. As can be seen from the statement budgetary control includes at the same time a planning and coordination mechanism for actions and performance ex ante as well as a control mechanism ex post through a comparison between estimated and actual plans and performance. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8373 Files in this item: 1
Carsten_Rohde_Budgeting_Beyond.pdf (1.122Mb) -
Poulsen, Thorbjørn; Plenborg, Thomas; Rohde, Carsten (Frederiksberg, 2009)[More information][Less information]
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Plenborg, Thomas; Petersen, Christian; Gabrielsen, Gorm; Banghøj, Jesper (Frederiksberg, 2009)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We examine what determines executive compensation in privately held firms. Our study is motivated by the fact that most studies in this area rely on data from publicly traded firms. Further, the few studies that are based on data from privately held firms only examine a limited number of determinants of executive compensation. Our findings indicate that the pay to performance relation is weak. Board size and ownership concentration are the only corporate governance characteristics that explain variations in executive compensation. Executive characteristics like skills, title and educational attainment all explain variations in executive compensation. Contrary to our expectations we do not find a stronger pay to performance relation in firms with better designed bonus plans. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7958 Files in this item: 1
WP_2009-01[1].pdf (271.1Kb) -
Belyst ved investorer og analytikeres holdningerPlenborg, Thomas; Holm, Jakob Wagner; Banghøj, Jesper; Østrup, Jens (Frederiksberg, 2009)[More information][Less information]
