Browsing Working Papers (AA/ACC) by Author "Banghøj, Jesper"
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Plenborg, Thomas; Petersen, Christian; Gabrielsen, Gorm; Banghøj, Jesper (Frederiksberg, 2009)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We examine what determines executive compensation in privately held firms. Our study is motivated by the fact that most studies in this area rely on data from publicly traded firms. Further, the few studies that are based on data from privately held firms only examine a limited number of determinants of executive compensation. Our findings indicate that the pay to performance relation is weak. Board size and ownership concentration are the only corporate governance characteristics that explain variations in executive compensation. Executive characteristics like skills, title and educational attainment all explain variations in executive compensation. Contrary to our expectations we do not find a stronger pay to performance relation in firms with better designed bonus plans. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7958 Files in this item: 1
WP_2009-01[1].pdf (271.1Kb) -
Banghøj, Jesper; Petersen, Christian; Plenborg, Thomas (København, 2008)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We examine what determines executive compensation in privately held firms. Our study is motivated by the fact that most studies in this area rely on data from publicly traded firms. Further, the few studies that are based on data from privately held firms only examine a limited number of determinants of executive compensation. Previous studies also assume that the quality of compensation contracts is identical across executives. Based on unique data from our survey we create a quality index on each executive’s bonus plan. We conjecture that the pay to performance relation is stronger for better designed bonus plans. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6751 Files in this item: 1
wp_2008-02.pdf (167.1Kb) -
Banghøj, Jesper; Plenborg, Thomas (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We explore the impact of stock pay and stock holdings on the pay to performance sensitivity in Denmark. Our research is motivated by the fact that most non-UK/US studies ignore stock based pay and stock holdings when measuring the pay to performance sensitivity. Further, most studies that explore the pay to performance relation apply the Black and Scholes approach assuming that the executive is both risk neutral due to hedge possibilities and well diversified. However, as pointed by Hall and Murphy (2002) executives are neither risk neutral nor well diversified. We adopt the certainty equivalence approach developed by Lambert et al (1991) to demonstrate that in a setting where executives are risk averse and undiversified there is a gap between the cost of granting stock options and the value, which executives receive from the same stock option program. Our findings indicate that the Danish level of pay is lower than in the UK and the US but more in line with the pay in other Scandinavian countries. Further, our results show that stock options are less frequently used to compensate Danish executives. On the other hand, stock ownership seems to be a more popular way to align the interests of the management and the shareholders than stock options. Furthermore, including stock holdings affect our four pay to performance sensitivity measures significantly. We also demonstrate that the pay to performance sensitivity is considerably lower than indicated by the Black and Scholes approach. Finally, the pay to performance sensitivity is on average smaller in Denmark than in the US. However, the pay to performance sensitivity seems similar in Denmark and the UK. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6741 Files in this item: 1
wp_2007-01.pdf (277.2Kb) -
Belyst ved investorer og analytikeres holdningerPlenborg, Thomas; Holm, Jakob Wagner; Banghøj, Jesper; Østrup, Jens (Frederiksberg, 2009)[More information][Less information]
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Erfaringer fra praksisPlenborg, Thomas; Ravnkilde Nielsen, Thomas Tang; Jensen, Morten; Banghøj, Jesper (Frederiksberg, 2009)[More information][Less information]
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Banghøj, Jesper; Plenborg, Thomas (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper examines if the level of voluntary disclosure affects the association between current returns and future earnings. Economic theory suggests that firms might find it advantageous to provide additional pieces of information (i.e., voluntary disclosure) to investors and analysts (Verrecchia 1983). Our results indicate that more voluntary disclosure does not improve the association between current returns and future earnings; i.e. current returns do not reflect more future earnings news. This finding raises the question whether voluntary information in the annual report contains value relevant information about future earnings or if investors are simply not capable of incorporating voluntary information in the firm value estimates. Key words: Disclosure, future earnings, informativeness URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6742 Files in this item: 1
artikel_udkast_010606.pdf (534.4Kb)
Now showing items 1-6 of 6