Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms

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Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms

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Title: Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms
Author: Banghøj, Jesper; Petersen, Christian; Plenborg, Thomas
Abstract: We examine what determines executive compensation in privately held firms. Our study is motivated by the fact that most studies in this area rely on data from publicly traded firms. Further, the few studies that are based on data from privately held firms only examine a limited number of determinants of executive compensation. Previous studies also assume that the quality of compensation contracts is identical across executives. Based on unique data from our survey we create a quality index on each executive’s bonus plan. We conjecture that the pay to performance relation is stronger for better designed bonus plans.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6751
Date: 2008-12-16

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