Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms

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dc.contributor.author	Banghøj, Jesper	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Petersen, Christian	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Plenborg, Thomas	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2009-02-04T10:24:35Z
dc.date.available	2009-02-04T10:24:35Z
dc.date.issued	2008-12-16T00:00:00Z	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6751
dc.description.abstract	We examine what determines executive compensation in privately held firms. Our study is motivated by the fact that most studies in this area rely on data from publicly traded firms. Further, the few studies that are based on data from privately held firms only examine a limited number of determinants of executive compensation. Previous studies also assume that the quality of compensation contracts is identical across executives. Based on unique data from our survey we create a quality index on each executive’s bonus plan. We conjecture that the pay to performance relation is stronger for better designed bonus plans.	en_US
dc.format.extent	32 s.	en_US
dc.language	eng	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working paper;2008-02	en_US
dc.title	Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms	en_US
dc.type	wp	en_US
dc.accessionstatus	modt08dec16 nijemo	en_US
dc.contributor.corporation	Copenhagen Business School. CBS	en_US
dc.contributor.department	Institut for Regnskab og Revision	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort	RR	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk	Department of Accounting and Auditing	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort	AA	en_US
dc.idnumber	x656558996	en_US
dc.publisher.city	København	en_US
dc.publisher.year	2008	en_US