Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms

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Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms

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dc.contributor.author Banghøj, Jesper en_US
dc.contributor.author Petersen, Christian en_US
dc.contributor.author Plenborg, Thomas en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:24:35Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:24:35Z
dc.date.issued 2008-12-16T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6751
dc.description.abstract We examine what determines executive compensation in privately held firms. Our study is motivated by the fact that most studies in this area rely on data from publicly traded firms. Further, the few studies that are based on data from privately held firms only examine a limited number of determinants of executive compensation. Previous studies also assume that the quality of compensation contracts is identical across executives. Based on unique data from our survey we create a quality index on each executive’s bonus plan. We conjecture that the pay to performance relation is stronger for better designed bonus plans. en_US
dc.format.extent 32 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2008-02 en_US
dc.title Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt08dec16 nijemo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Regnskab og Revision en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort RR en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Accounting and Auditing en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort AA en_US
dc.idnumber x656558996 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2008 en_US


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