Bank Insolvency Procedures and Market Discipline in European Banking

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dc.contributor.author	Wihlborg, Clas	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Angkinand, Apanard	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2009-02-04T10:24:46Z
dc.date.available	2009-02-04T10:24:46Z
dc.date.issued	2006-01-02T00:00:00Z	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6773
dc.description.abstract	Predetermined, operational procedures for dealing with banks in distress are conspicuously absent across the world with very few exceptions. Instead governments and regulatory authorities intervene when banks approach failure. Bail-outs of important creditors, sometimes including shareholders, and blanket guarantees for creditors become the norm. We argue that efficient incentives of banks’ creditors, as well as of shareholders and managers, require predetermined rules for dealing with banks in distress, and a group of creditors that are credibly non-insured. Cross-border banking increases the need for pre-determined bank insolvency procedures that could enable banks to expand cross-border in branches. In the empirical part we show that credibility of non-insurance is maximized with a partial deposit insurance scheme, and that the coverage can be decreased if effective rule-based distress resolution procedures are implemented.	en_US
dc.format.extent	23 s.	en_US
dc.language	eng	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	LEFIC Working paper;2005-008	en_US
dc.title	Bank Insolvency Procedures and Market Discipline in European Banking	en_US
dc.type	wp	en_US
dc.accessionstatus	modt06jan02 miel	en_US
dc.contributor.corporation	Copenhagen Business School. CBS	en_US
dc.contributor.department	Center for Law, Economics and Financial Institutions at CBS	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort	LEFIC	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk	Center for Law, Economics and Financial Institutions at CBS	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort	LEFIC	en_US
dc.idnumber	x656504306	en_US
dc.publisher.city	København	en_US
dc.publisher.year	2005	en_US