A Federal Constitution for the European Union

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A Federal Constitution for the European Union

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Title: A Federal Constitution for the European Union
Some Lessons from United States Constitutional History
Author: Sweeney, Richard J.
Abstract: A constitution is more likely to be accepted if it federalizes those issues that are widely seen as needing complete harmonization. A constitution is more likely to endure if the federal government does not have powers that are not vital to it but which may alienate some member states to the point that the federal government loses legitimacy. It appears vital to have trade policy at the European Union level; for euro countries, monetary policy is already federalized. It is not clear that common foreign and defense policies are needed; insisting on common foreign and defense policies may lead to conflicts within and across member states that severely weaken the Union, conceivably contributing to eventual collapse. Insisting on harmonization of commercial codes does not have the destructive potential of attempting completely to harmonize defense and foreign policies; it may, however, lead to needless conflict that helps drain the reservoir of goodwill that the European Union will need for dealing with other conflicts amongst member states.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6787
Date: 2003-11-21

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