A Federal Constitution for the European Union

OPEN ARCHIVE

Union Jack
Dannebrog

A Federal Constitution for the European Union

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Sweeney, Richard J. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:24:50Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:24:50Z
dc.date.issued 2003-11-21T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6787
dc.description.abstract A constitution is more likely to be accepted if it federalizes those issues that are widely seen as needing complete harmonization. A constitution is more likely to endure if the federal government does not have powers that are not vital to it but which may alienate some member states to the point that the federal government loses legitimacy. It appears vital to have trade policy at the European Union level; for euro countries, monetary policy is already federalized. It is not clear that common foreign and defense policies are needed; insisting on common foreign and defense policies may lead to conflicts within and across member states that severely weaken the Union, conceivably contributing to eventual collapse. Insisting on harmonization of commercial codes does not have the destructive potential of attempting completely to harmonize defense and foreign policies; it may, however, lead to needless conflict that helps drain the reservoir of goodwill that the European Union will need for dealing with other conflicts amongst member states. en_US
dc.format.extent 63 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries LEFIC working paper;2003-09 en_US
dc.subject.other eu-traktater en_US
dc.subject.other eu en_US
dc.subject.other forfatninger en_US
dc.subject.other usa en_US
dc.title A Federal Constitution for the European Union en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt03nov21 inrumo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Finansiering en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort LEFIC en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Finance en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort DF en_US
dc.idnumber x656312709 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2003 en_US
dc.title.subtitle Some Lessons from United States Constitutional History en_US


Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License.

Files Size Format View
wplefic092003.pdf 432.3Kb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record