Solving the Bargaining Democracy Problem Using a Constitutional Hierarchy

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Solving the Bargaining Democracy Problem Using a Constitutional Hierarchy

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Title: Solving the Bargaining Democracy Problem Using a Constitutional Hierarchy
Author: Wihlborg, Clas
Abstract: The democratic deficit in the so-called bargaining democracy provides the motivation for constitutional efforts to limit the ability of different groups to form coalitions that are able to grant benefits to themselves through legislation that more or less directly benefit identifiable groups. A constitutional hierachy of laws that stand in conflict is proposed. In this hierarchy more "rule-oriented" legislation dominate less "rule-oriented" legislation. The main purpose of the proposal is to create a momentum of the political process towards more rule-oriented policy actions and legislation, and to inspire the policy debate to focus on principles and rules to an increasing extent. At the same time, the difficulty of defining a rule as opposed to an outcome-oriented directive is avoided by limiting the task of a constitutional court to simply rank conflicting policy actions with respect to the degree actions satisfy criteria for rules.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6791
Date: 2004-06-21
Notes: Erstatter tidl. LEFIC working paper 2003-07

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