Solving the Bargaining Democracy Problem Using a Constitutional Hierarchy

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Solving the Bargaining Democracy Problem Using a Constitutional Hierarchy

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dc.contributor.author Wihlborg, Clas en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:24:51Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:24:51Z
dc.date.issued 2004-06-21T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6791
dc.description.abstract The democratic deficit in the so-called bargaining democracy provides the motivation for constitutional efforts to limit the ability of different groups to form coalitions that are able to grant benefits to themselves through legislation that more or less directly benefit identifiable groups. A constitutional hierachy of laws that stand in conflict is proposed. In this hierarchy more "rule-oriented" legislation dominate less "rule-oriented" legislation. The main purpose of the proposal is to create a momentum of the political process towards more rule-oriented policy actions and legislation, and to inspire the policy debate to focus on principles and rules to an increasing extent. At the same time, the difficulty of defining a rule as opposed to an outcome-oriented directive is avoided by limiting the task of a constitutional court to simply rank conflicting policy actions with respect to the degree actions satisfy criteria for rules. en_US
dc.format.extent 20 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries LEFIC Working paper;2004-05 en_US
dc.subject.other bargaining-beslutningsteori en_US
dc.subject.other politiske beslutningsprocesser en_US
dc.subject.other politik en_US
dc.subject.other demokrati en_US
dc.subject.other hayek en_US
dc.subject.other buchanan en_US
dc.title Solving the Bargaining Democracy Problem Using a Constitutional Hierarchy en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt04jun21 mielmo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Finansiering en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort LEFIC en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Finance en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort DF en_US
dc.description.notes Erstatter tidl. LEFIC working paper 2003-07 en_US
dc.idnumber x656409419 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2004 en_US


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