Trade Secret Laws, Labor Mobility and Innovations

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dc.contributor.author	Motta, Massimo	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Rønde, Thomas	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2009-02-04T10:24:53Z
dc.date.available	2009-02-04T10:24:53Z
dc.date.issued	2004-06-15T00:00:00Z	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6800
dc.description.abstract	We show that when the researcher’s (observable but not contractible) contribution to innovation is crucial, a covenant not to compete (CNC) reduces effort and profits under both spot and relational contracts. Having no CNC allows the researcher to leave for a rival. This alleviates a commitment problem by forcing the firm to reward a successful researcher. However, if the firm’s R&D investment mainly matters, including a CNC in the contract is optimal, as it ensures the firm’s incentives to invest. JEL Codes: J3, K2, L14, O31, O34. Keywords: Innovation, intellectual property rights, labor contracts, poaching, relational contracts, start-ups.	en_US
dc.format.extent	35 s.	en_US
dc.language	eng	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	LEFIC Working paper;2002-12	en_US
dc.subject.other	kep	en_US
dc.title	Trade Secret Laws, Labor Mobility and Innovations	en_US
dc.type	wp	en_US
dc.accessionstatus	modt04jun15 mielmo	en_US
dc.contributor.corporation	Copenhagen Business School. CBS	en_US
dc.contributor.department	Center for Law, Economics and Financial Institutions at CBS
dc.contributor.departmentshort	LEFIC	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk	Center for Law, Economics and Financial Institutions at CBS
dc.contributor.departmentukshort	LEFIC
dc.idnumber	x656409354	en_US
dc.publisher.city	København	en_US
dc.publisher.year	2002	en_US