Trade Secret Laws, Labor Mobility and Innovations

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Trade Secret Laws, Labor Mobility and Innovations

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dc.contributor.author Motta, Massimo en_US
dc.contributor.author Rønde, Thomas en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:24:53Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:24:53Z
dc.date.issued 2004-06-15T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6800
dc.description.abstract We show that when the researcher’s (observable but not contractible) contribution to innovation is crucial, a covenant not to compete (CNC) reduces effort and profits under both spot and relational contracts. Having no CNC allows the researcher to leave for a rival. This alleviates a commitment problem by forcing the firm to reward a successful researcher. However, if the firm’s R&D investment mainly matters, including a CNC in the contract is optimal, as it ensures the firm’s incentives to invest. JEL Codes: J3, K2, L14, O31, O34. Keywords: Innovation, intellectual property rights, labor contracts, poaching, relational contracts, start-ups. en_US
dc.format.extent 35 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries LEFIC Working paper;2002-12 en_US
dc.subject.other kep en_US
dc.title Trade Secret Laws, Labor Mobility and Innovations en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt04jun15 mielmo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Center for Law, Economics and Financial Institutions at CBS
dc.contributor.departmentshort LEFIC en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Center for Law, Economics and Financial Institutions at CBS
dc.contributor.departmentukshort LEFIC
dc.idnumber x656409354 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2002 en_US


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