The competition law & economics of electricity market regulation

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The competition law & economics of electricity market regulation

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dc.contributor.author Møllgaard, Peter en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:24:53Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:24:53Z
dc.date.issued 2004-05-12T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6801
dc.description.abstract Abstract: Price correlations are used to delineate the geographic market in two recent Danish electricity cases. They indicate that power generators hold temporally transitory and irregularly intermittent dominant positions. Calculation of the Lerner index reveals that they abused this position. The Danish Competition Authority decided to settle this case by agreement for reasons explained. We finally indicate how economics may be used pro-actively to achieve a better market design. en_US
dc.format.extent 11 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries LEFIC Working paper;2003-02 en_US
dc.subject.other danmark en_US
dc.subject.other konkurrencepolitik en_US
dc.subject.other elforsyning en_US
dc.subject.other elektricitet en_US
dc.subject.other elsam en_US
dc.subject.other elkraft en_US
dc.subject.other e2 en_US
dc.title The competition law & economics of electricity market regulation en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt04maj12inrumo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Center for Law, Economics and Financial Institutions at CBS
dc.contributor.departmentshort LEFIC en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Center for Law, Economics and Financial Institutions at CBS
dc.contributor.departmentukshort LEFIC
dc.idnumber x656102577 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2003 en_US


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