The competition law & economics of electricity market regulation

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dc.contributor.author	Møllgaard, Peter	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2009-02-04T10:24:53Z
dc.date.available	2009-02-04T10:24:53Z
dc.date.issued	2004-05-12T00:00:00Z	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6801
dc.description.abstract	Abstract: Price correlations are used to delineate the geographic market in two recent Danish electricity cases. They indicate that power generators hold temporally transitory and irregularly intermittent dominant positions. Calculation of the Lerner index reveals that they abused this position. The Danish Competition Authority decided to settle this case by agreement for reasons explained. We finally indicate how economics may be used pro-actively to achieve a better market design.	en_US
dc.format.extent	11 s.	en_US
dc.language	eng	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	LEFIC Working paper;2003-02	en_US
dc.subject.other	danmark	en_US
dc.subject.other	konkurrencepolitik	en_US
dc.subject.other	elforsyning	en_US
dc.subject.other	elektricitet	en_US
dc.subject.other	elsam	en_US
dc.subject.other	elkraft	en_US
dc.subject.other	e2	en_US
dc.title	The competition law & economics of electricity market regulation	en_US
dc.type	wp	en_US
dc.accessionstatus	modt04maj12inrumo	en_US
dc.contributor.corporation	Copenhagen Business School. CBS	en_US
dc.contributor.department	Center for Law, Economics and Financial Institutions at CBS
dc.contributor.departmentshort	LEFIC	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk	Center for Law, Economics and Financial Institutions at CBS
dc.contributor.departmentukshort	LEFIC
dc.idnumber	x656102577	en_US
dc.publisher.city	København	en_US
dc.publisher.year	2003	en_US