The Transfer of Property Rights by Theft

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The Transfer of Property Rights by Theft

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dc.contributor.author Rose, Caspar en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:24:53Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:24:53Z
dc.date.issued 2006-01-02T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6802
dc.description.abstract This article studies the involuntary transfer of property rights by theft - a topic almost unexplored in the law and economics literature. The question is whether a buyer of a stolen good should obtain title to the good if he/she has purchased it in good faith. As described in the article different jurisdictions treat this issue differently. The traditional theory suggests that there is a tradeoff between the costs of protecting the good and the costs of verifying the ownership. However, as shown, the rule of law concerning this issue significantly affects parties’ incentives. Specifically, it is shown that a rule of law where good faith is irrelevant in determining the issue of property rights Pareto dominates a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer. Thus, an owner of an asset will spend more resources on protecting his property and potential buyers will incur higher costs in order to verify the ownership when good faith is decisive for the transfer of property rights. JEL Classification: K11, K14 and K42 Keywords: property right law, theft, good faith and game theory en_US
dc.format.extent 36 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries LEFIC Working paper;2005-009 en_US
dc.title The Transfer of Property Rights by Theft en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt06jan02 miel en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Center for Law, Economics and Financial Institutions at CBS en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort LEFIC en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Center for Law, Economics and Financial Institutions at CBS en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort LEFIC en_US
dc.idnumber x656517270 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2005 en_US
dc.title.subtitle An Economic Analysis en_US


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