Are Delegation and Incentives Complementary Instruments ?

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Are Delegation and Incentives Complementary Instruments ?

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Titel: Are Delegation and Incentives Complementary Instruments ?
Forfatter: Lando, Henrik
Resume: It is natural to suppose that delegation and incentives are complementary both in the sense that when more decisions are delegated to a lower level of an organizational hierarchy, more use should be made of incentives at that level, and in the sense that more use of incentives should be accompanied by more delegation. This issue is analyzed within a Principal-Agent framework in which there are two decisions to be made: an effort decision which can only be made by the Agent, and some other decision which can be made by either the Principal (i.e. be centralized) or by the Agent (i.e. be delegated). Within this framework it is shown that delegation and incentives are not necessarily complementary instruments; some decisions should be centralized when incentives are introduced.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6813
Dato: 2004-04-30

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