Are Delegation and Incentives Complementary Instruments ?

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Are Delegation and Incentives Complementary Instruments ?

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dc.contributor.author Lando, Henrik en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:24:54Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:24:54Z
dc.date.issued 2004-04-30T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6813
dc.description.abstract It is natural to suppose that delegation and incentives are complementary both in the sense that when more decisions are delegated to a lower level of an organizational hierarchy, more use should be made of incentives at that level, and in the sense that more use of incentives should be accompanied by more delegation. This issue is analyzed within a Principal-Agent framework in which there are two decisions to be made: an effort decision which can only be made by the Agent, and some other decision which can be made by either the Principal (i.e. be centralized) or by the Agent (i.e. be delegated). Within this framework it is shown that delegation and incentives are not necessarily complementary instruments; some decisions should be centralized when incentives are introduced. en_US
dc.format.extent 21 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries LEFIC Working paper;2004-02 en_US
dc.subject.other belønningssystemer en_US
dc.subject.other incitamentsaflønning en_US
dc.subject.other agentteori en_US
dc.subject.other uddelegering en_US
dc.subject.other beslutningsteori en_US
dc.title Are Delegation and Incentives Complementary Instruments ? en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt04apr30 inrumo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Industriøkonomi og Virksomhedsstrategi en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort LEFIC en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Industrial Economics & Strategy en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort IVS en_US
dc.idnumber x645152683 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2004 en_US


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