On the Choice Between Such Simple Mechanisms as Individual Ownership and the First-come First-serve Rule When Renegotiation is Costly

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On the Choice Between Such Simple Mechanisms as Individual Ownership and the First-come First-serve Rule When Renegotiation is Costly

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dc.contributor.author Lando, Henrik en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:24:54Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:24:54Z
dc.date.issued 2004-06-15T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6815
dc.description.abstract This article compares a set of often used simple contracts or mechanisms in terms of how well they allocate decision rights between two agents over time. A basic assumption is that agents incur a fixed cost each time they renegotiate. The contracts or mechanisms studied are: individual ownership and authority, the first-come first-serve rule, the alternating rule and the sign-up rule. One trade-off that arises is the following: when usage of the asset is flexible in the sense that it does not matter in which period it occurs, agents may rely on obtaining the asset through arriving first at some point, while when an agent needs to time and plan the use of the asset, he or she may wish to hold stronger rights or to use the sign-up rule as a simple form of contracting. (JEL:D10, D23, L22); Keywords: Incomplete contracts, individual ownership,first-come first-serve rule, costly renegotiation. en_US
dc.format.extent 31 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries LEFIC Working paper;2004-01 en_US
dc.subject.other kep en_US
dc.title On the Choice Between Such Simple Mechanisms as Individual Ownership and the First-come First-serve Rule When Renegotiation is Costly en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt04jun15 mielmo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Industriøkonomi og Virksomhedsstrategi en_US
dc.contributor.department Center for Law, Economics & Financial Institutions
dc.contributor.departmentshort IVS en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort LEFIC
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Industrial Economics & Strategy en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Center for Law, Economics & Financial Institutions
dc.contributor.departmentukshort IES
dc.contributor.departmentukshort LEFIC
dc.idnumber x656409303 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2004 en_US


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