On the Choice Between Such Simple Mechanisms as Individual Ownership and the First-come First-serve Rule When Renegotiation is Costly

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dc.contributor.author	Lando, Henrik	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2009-02-04T10:24:54Z
dc.date.available	2009-02-04T10:24:54Z
dc.date.issued	2004-06-15T00:00:00Z	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6815
dc.description.abstract	This article compares a set of often used simple contracts or mechanisms in terms of how well they allocate decision rights between two agents over time. A basic assumption is that agents incur a fixed cost each time they renegotiate. The contracts or mechanisms studied are: individual ownership and authority, the first-come first-serve rule, the alternating rule and the sign-up rule. One trade-off that arises is the following: when usage of the asset is flexible in the sense that it does not matter in which period it occurs, agents may rely on obtaining the asset through arriving first at some point, while when an agent needs to time and plan the use of the asset, he or she may wish to hold stronger rights or to use the sign-up rule as a simple form of contracting. (JEL:D10, D23, L22); Keywords: Incomplete contracts, individual ownership,first-come first-serve rule, costly renegotiation.	en_US
dc.format.extent	31 s.	en_US
dc.language	eng	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	LEFIC Working paper;2004-01	en_US
dc.subject.other	kep	en_US
dc.title	On the Choice Between Such Simple Mechanisms as Individual Ownership and the First-come First-serve Rule When Renegotiation is Costly	en_US
dc.type	wp	en_US
dc.accessionstatus	modt04jun15 mielmo	en_US
dc.contributor.corporation	Copenhagen Business School. CBS	en_US
dc.contributor.department	Institut for Industriøkonomi og Virksomhedsstrategi	en_US
dc.contributor.department	Center for Law, Economics & Financial Institutions
dc.contributor.departmentshort	IVS	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort	LEFIC
dc.contributor.departmentuk	Department of Industrial Economics & Strategy	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk	Center for Law, Economics & Financial Institutions
dc.contributor.departmentukshort	IES
dc.contributor.departmentukshort	LEFIC
dc.idnumber	x656409303	en_US
dc.publisher.city	København	en_US
dc.publisher.year	2004	en_US