On the Enforcement of Specific Performance in Civil Law Countries

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dc.contributor.author	Lando, Henrik	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Rose, Caspar	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2009-02-04T10:24:55Z
dc.date.available	2009-02-04T10:24:55Z
dc.date.issued	2003-11-21T00:00:00Z	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6823
dc.description.abstract	Abstract: Proponents of specific performance as a remedy for breach of contract have found support in the alleged use of the remedy in Civil Law countries. However, we provide evidence that specific performance is in fact a rare remedy in Denmark, Germany and France, and under CISG, when performance requires actions to be undertaken, and we relate this to costs of enforcement. We argue that it is administratively costly to run a system of enforcement that renders specific performance attractive to the aggrieved party, and that the Civil Law countries have (like Common Law countries) chosen not to incur these costs of enforcement. This is especially clear in the case of Denmark, where specific performance of actions has been abandoned as a legal remedy. At the normative level, we argue that enforcement costs provides an additional rationale, over and above the rationales of the theory of efficient breach, for damages and against specific performance as the general remedy.	en_US
dc.format.extent	26 s.	en_US
dc.language	eng	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	LEFIC working paper;2003-14	en_US
dc.subject.other	retsøkonomi	en_US
dc.subject.other	kontrakter	en_US
dc.subject.other	aftaleret	en_US
dc.subject.other	kontraktteori	en_US
dc.subject.other	personret	en_US
dc.title	On the Enforcement of Specific Performance in Civil Law Countries	en_US
dc.type	wp	en_US
dc.accessionstatus	modt03nov21 inrumo	en_US
dc.contributor.corporation	Copenhagen Business School. CBS	en_US
dc.contributor.department	Institut for Industriøkonomi og Virksomhedsstrategi	en_US
dc.contributor.department	Institut for Finansiering	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort	LEFIC	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort	FI
dc.contributor.departmentshort	IVS
dc.contributor.departmentuk	Department of Industrial Economics & Strategy	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk	Department of Finance	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk	Center for Law, Economics & Financial Institutions
dc.contributor.departmentukshort	FI
dc.contributor.departmentukshort	IES
dc.contributor.departmentukshort	LEFIC
dc.idnumber	x656312652	en_US
dc.publisher.city	København	en_US
dc.publisher.year	2003	en_US