On the Enforcement of Specific Performance in Civil Law Countries

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On the Enforcement of Specific Performance in Civil Law Countries

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dc.contributor.author Lando, Henrik en_US
dc.contributor.author Rose, Caspar en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:24:55Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:24:55Z
dc.date.issued 2003-11-21T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6823
dc.description.abstract Abstract: Proponents of specific performance as a remedy for breach of contract have found support in the alleged use of the remedy in Civil Law countries. However, we provide evidence that specific performance is in fact a rare remedy in Denmark, Germany and France, and under CISG, when performance requires actions to be undertaken, and we relate this to costs of enforcement. We argue that it is administratively costly to run a system of enforcement that renders specific performance attractive to the aggrieved party, and that the Civil Law countries have (like Common Law countries) chosen not to incur these costs of enforcement. This is especially clear in the case of Denmark, where specific performance of actions has been abandoned as a legal remedy. At the normative level, we argue that enforcement costs provides an additional rationale, over and above the rationales of the theory of efficient breach, for damages and against specific performance as the general remedy. en_US
dc.format.extent 26 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries LEFIC working paper;2003-14 en_US
dc.subject.other retsøkonomi en_US
dc.subject.other kontrakter en_US
dc.subject.other aftaleret en_US
dc.subject.other kontraktteori en_US
dc.subject.other personret en_US
dc.title On the Enforcement of Specific Performance in Civil Law Countries en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt03nov21 inrumo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Industriøkonomi og Virksomhedsstrategi en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Finansiering en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort LEFIC en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort FI
dc.contributor.departmentshort IVS
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Industrial Economics & Strategy en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Finance en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Center for Law, Economics & Financial Institutions
dc.contributor.departmentukshort FI
dc.contributor.departmentukshort IES
dc.contributor.departmentukshort LEFIC
dc.idnumber x656312652 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2003 en_US


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