Who Really Profits from Patent Infringements?

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Who Really Profits from Patent Infringements?

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dc.contributor.author Reitzig, Markus en_US
dc.contributor.author Henkel, Joachim en_US
dc.contributor.author Heath, Christopher en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:24:56Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:24:56Z
dc.date.issued 2004-06-15T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6827
dc.description.abstract Abstract: This paper contributes to the fundamental discussion of setting optimal liabilities in restitution law by analyzing the effects that the existing multitude of indemnification rules for patent infringements have on innovative and imitative activity. From a theoretical legal standpoint, the choice of patent law is particularly enlightening due to its hybrid public and private nature. From an economic perspective its relevance lies in regulating the driving forces of welfare in highly industrialized societies. Our analysis of regulations from six different jurisdictions (US, JP, DE, UK, FR, NL) reveals that from a scholarly standpoint none of the regulations sets optimal liabilities in general. Our major finding is that an expectation damage rule based on a renegotiation outcome from an ex-ante perspective (falling in between the generic legal notions of ‘lost profits’ and ‘infringer’s profits’) between licensor and licensee appears optimal in patent infringement cases to avoid dynamic inefficiencies. The result is intuitive, however, was not predicted by the existing literature on indemnification law. Keywords: Patents, litigation, damage awards, innovation, infringement JEL-Classifications: K41,L00, L20 en_US
dc.format.extent 47 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries LEFIC Working paper;2002-18 en_US
dc.subject.other kep en_US
dc.title Who Really Profits from Patent Infringements? en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt04jun15 mielmo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Center for Law, Economics & Financial Institutions
dc.contributor.departmentshort LEFIC en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Center for Law, Economics & Financial Institutions
dc.contributor.departmentukshort LEFIC
dc.idnumber x65640932x en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2002 en_US
dc.title.subtitle A Comparative International Analysis of Innovation Incentives from Patent Indemnification Rules en_US


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